Analyst Following and Market Liquidity

By Darren T. Roulstone. 2003

363 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d7da2699c503c62f6b14cab1d20db1a6f419c92a

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Citations in the corpus

Transparency and Liquidity Uncertainty in Crisis Periods (2011, methodology): “Following prior research such as Roulstone (2003) and Yu (2008), a primary concern is that analyst following may be endogenously determined based on investor demand for information.20 We follow Roulstone (2003) and Yu (2008), in modeling determinants of transparency.”
Intellectual capital disclosure, cost of finance and firm value (2009, positive): “In the empirical literature on firm value, analyst following is used as a proxy for the quality of a firm’s information environment and for the extent of corporate financial information that is publicly available (Imhoff and Lobo, 1992; Roulstone, 2003).”
Transparency, Liquidity, and Valuation: International Evidence (2009, neutral): “Chung, McInish, Wood and Wyhowski (1995) argue that increased analyst following is associated with increased information asymmetry and reduced liquidity, while Roulstone (2003) suggests that analyst following increases publicly available information and increases liquidity.”
Retail Investor Attention and Stock Liquidity (2015, methodology): “To further strengthen the causal inferences of the results, we also employ the Granger test as additional robustness checks by following the studies of the determinants of stock liquidity (e.g. Roulstone, 2003; Chordia et al., 2005; and Goyenko et al., 2009).”
Managers Set the Tone: Equity Incentives and the Tone of Earnings Press Releases (2016, neutral): “Firms with high information asymmetry have a lower analyst coverage (Roulstone, 2003), as well as a lower share turnover because uninformed traders are less likely to trade in these shares, knowing that they will lose to informed traders (Mohd, 2005).”
Does International Cross-Listing Improve the Information Environment? (2008, neutral): “Second, Easley, O’Hara, and Paperman (1998) and Roulstone (2003) argue that analyst activity is not necessarily a good proxy for private information trading because analysts are ‘‘showcasing’’ devices and they do not have significant firm-specific information.”
Does Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards Reduce Information Asymmetry in Equity Markets? * (2017, background): “The great majority of empirial studies on this topic report that analyst coverage is egatively related to information asymmetry (e.g. Easley t al., 1998; Roulstone, 2003).”
The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Firm Transparency and Information Production (2015, positive): “Similarly, empirical evidence associates greater analyst following (Roulstone, 2003) and lower analyst forecast dispersion (Sadka and Scherbina, 2007) with greater liquidity.”
Analysts’ Forecasts and Asset Pricing: A Survey (2016, background): “For example, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995), Easley, O’Hara, and Paperman (1998), and Roulstone (2003) show that analysts create a more equitable information environment among investors by publicly disclosing information that would otherwise be costly to process.”