The Role of Incomplete Contracts in Self-Enforcing Relationships

By Benjamin Klein. 2000

121 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d7bc1e1dd12324411eea22045fec029c98b3d5b1

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1. Robert Gibbons
2. Jean Tirole
3. Roland Bénabou
4. Andrei Hagiu
5. Anton Korinek
6. Panos Kouvelis
7. P. Joskow
8. R. Rajan

Citations in the corpus

• Cognition and Incomplete Contracts (2009, background): “Thinking through alternatives ex post, 31 For example, Klein (2002) argues: “If [the pioneering Grossman and Hart model of integration] has the advantage of taking the incompleteness of contracts seriously, it does not consider the key aspect of the contractual arrangement we identify with the…”
• Four formal(izable) theories of the firm (2005, background): “I am fully persuaded that rent-seeking between organizations is an important transaction cost of non-integration, but after a detailed and persuasive discussion of such “post-contractual opportunism” under non-integration, Klein et al. (hereafter KCA) observe that: “Vertical integration does not com”