Do the SEC’s Enforcement Preferences Affect Corporate Misconduct?

By Simi Kedia, Shivaram Rajgopal. 2011

613 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d6000a28a54867e2d8d6e5617abd4ec34334b58c

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Paul N. Michas
2. Dan S. Dhaliwal
3. Monica Neamtiu
4. Daniel A. Bens
5. Sang-Eun Yi
6. John Y. Campbell
7. Wenjuan Xie
8. Jr. James R. Moon

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Paul N. Michas
2. Sang-Eun Yi
3. John Y. Campbell
4. Wenjuan Xie
5. Jr. James R. Moon
6. Jere R. Francis
7. Dan S. Dhaliwal
8. W. Johnson

Citations in the corpus

• Employee Quality and Financial Reporting Outcomes (2017, background): “SECDIST Distance between the firm's headquarters MSA and the responsible SEC regional office (see https://www.sec.gov/contact/addresses.htm).”
• Where do firms manage earnings? (2012, neutral): “Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) examine the geography of financial misreporting, but their study is focused on the location of corporate headquarters relative to an SEC office.”
• Evidence on Contagion in Earnings Management (2015, neutral): “5 Our study complements Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) who find that geographical distance between the firm and the SEC’s office explains firm’s propensity to misreport.”
• Corporate Fraud and the Value of Reputations in the Product Market (2014, positive): “This result is consistent with Kedia and Rajgopal (2011), who state that there is a geographic effect in terms of corporate misconduct.”
• The Effect of Tax Authority Monitoring and Enforcement on Financial Reporting Quality (2014, neutral): “While the absence of a relation between reporting quality and SEC proximity is inconsistent with Kedia and Rajgopal (2011), we note that unlike in Kedia and Rajgopal (2011), SEC proximity enters as an interaction term in our regressions since the main effect of SEC proximity is subsumed by firm…”
• The Contagion Effect of Low-Quality Audits (2013, methodology): “To control for potential regional differences, we include SEC regional office fixed effects in our models, as described later.”
• Rank and File Employees and the Discovery of Misreporting: The Role of Stock Options (2016, neutral): “Because the SEC has constrained resources, it is likely to pursue only those firms engaged in relatively egregious misreporting (Kedia and Rajgopal, 2011).”
• Geographic Proximity between Auditor and Client: How Does it Impact Audit Quality? (2012, neutral): “The variable CONCENT is included to control for the effect of auditor concentration on our results (Kedia and Rajgopal 2011; Kallapur et al. 2010).”