Agent Bank Behavior in Bank Loan Syndications

By Jonathan D. Jones, W. Lang, P.eter J Nigro. 2005

130 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d54ecc27142510f089ab60ac500813bd3aacba02

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Economics and Econometrics

In Finance

Citations in the corpus

The Pricing Effect of Certification on Syndicated Loans (2008, unknown): “The arranger's share is smaller when borrowers are less risky (Simons, 1993; Dennis and Mullineaux, 1994, 2000; Lee and Mullineaux, 2004; Jones et al., 2005) and when public information on them is available (Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000).”
Bank reputation in the private debt market (2010, background): “results of earlier studies that came to the opposite conclusion, such as that of Lee and Mullineaux (2001) and Sufi (2007), who, however, did not control for self-selection bias.”
Syndication, Interconnectedness, and Systemic Risk (2018, unknown): “, Jones, Lang and Nigro [31], Lee and Mullineaux [32], and Sufi [38]), lenders’reputation (e.”
On Loan Sales, Loan Contracting, and Lending Relationships (2009, background): “Typically, when loans are syndicated, the lead bank holds a portion of the loan to preserve its incentive to monitor borrowers (see e.g. Dennis & Mullineaux 2000; Jones et al. 2005).”
The role of information asymmetry and financial reporting quality in debt trading: Evidence from the secondary loan market $ (2008, unknown): “According to Jones et al. (2005), information asymmetries tend to be less severe for large loans, since any fixed costs associated with obtaining”
Price Discovery and Dissemination of Private Information by Loan Syndicate Participants (2010, background): “The syndicate participants typically rely on information provided by the arranger (Jones et al., 2005).”