Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub‐Saharan Africa*

By Deborah A. Bräutigam, Stephen F. Knack. Economic development and cultural change, 2004

1,177 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Development, Information Systems, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d42f6c2c12d716d4021ef44fc62bf5fe87e0b563

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Citations in the corpus

Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing? (2011, background): “…to bail out bad policies, siphon skilled workers away from government and thus weaken institutions, and spark conflict over aid rents (Deborah A. Brautigam and Knack 2004; Tim Harford and Michael Klein 2005). rent seekers induce negative external effects that depress profits for remaining…”
On Tax Efforts and Colonial Heritage in Africa (2010, result): “…us now turn to one final point that serves both as an additional test for the robustness of the results but also as a link to the more recent literature on tax effort that includes institutions among its determinants (Ghura, 1998; Gupta et al., 2003; Bird et al., 2004; Brautigam and Knack, 2004).”
Reinventing Foreign Aid for Inclusive and Sustainable Development: Kuznets, Piketty and the Great Policy Reversal (2016, neutral): “…include, inter alia: unproductive consumption from the government; the Dutch Disease and poor institutions (Knack, 2001; Remmer, 2004; Boone, 1996; Bräutigam & Knack, 2004; Rajan & Subramanian, 2008; Heckelman & Knack, 2008) and; vested interest, coupled with poor planning and implementation…”
Can REDD+ social safeguards reach the ‘right’ people? Lessons from Madagascar (2016, background): “Studies indicate that donor-driven programs and their implementers are rarely evaluated properly or sanctioned for failed outcomes (Martens, 2004; Bräutigam and Knack, 2004; Williamson, 2010).”
What Undermines Aid's Impact on Growth? (2005, background): “In sum, aid may not have discernible positive effects in the long run because it weakens institutions, and this offsets any positive effect it may have in the short run (Knack (2001) and Brautigam and Knack (2004)).”
Aid Is Not Oil: Donor Utility, Heterogeneous Aid, and the Aid-Democratization Relationship (2015, neutral): “Brautigam and Knack 2004, 275.”
Measuring and explaining government efficiency in developing countries (2007, background): “Development assistance may be endogenous to government efficiency as many donors allocate resources towards countries with improving institutional quality (Bräutigam and Knack, 2004).”
Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries (2008, background): “High aid levels appear, over time, to reduce both the overall tax take (Bräutigam and Knack 2004; Remmer 2004) and the quality of government institutions (Bräutigam and Knack 2004; Knack 2001).”
Taxation, Political Accountability and Foreign Aid: Lessons from Somaliland (2012, background): “Indeed, Brautigam and Knack ( 2004 ) find that high aid intensity is associated with deteriorating scores on the International Country Risk Guide index of expropriation risk, corruption, and bureaucratic quality as well as lower tax collection efforts.”