Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Institutions, and Fiscal Performance

By J. Hagen. 2002

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What Do Deficits Tell Us About Debt? Empirical Evidence on Creative Accounting with Fiscal Rules in the EU (2006, background): “They are introduced to reduce rent seeking behavior of politicians, to mitigate common pool problems, and, ultimately, to prevent undesired fiscal outcomes (von Hagen, 2002).”
Do Fiscal Rules Constrain Fiscal Policy? A Meta-Regression-Analysis (2015, result): “…comparable results we thus disregard other rules which may be relevant for the budgetary outcome such as budgetary procedures (as pioneered by von Hagen, 2002) or more general political-economic constraints such as, e.g., a supra-national fiscal rule like the Stability and Growth Pact.1 Our…”
Sub-national deficits in European countries: The impact of fiscal rules and tax autonomy (2014, background): “The design of the institutions responsible for the budgetary process is considered one major determinant of the cross-country heterogeneity in fiscal positions (among others, see von Hagen and Harden, 1994, 1995; von Hagen, 2002, 2005; Alesina and Perotti, 1996, for this line of argument).”
Fiscal Rules for Sub-Central Governments: Design and Impact (2005, background): “Alesina et al. (1996); Campos and Pradham (1996); Gleich (2003); and von Hagen (2002).”