Rethinking the Role of NAIRU in Monetary Policy: Implications of Model Formulation and Uncertainty
By Arturo Estrella, Frederic S. Mishkin. 2000
191 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d1e3ca384fa715898c3b3d00dfa672802c26f9a2
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In Economics and Econometrics
- Timothy Cogley
- Thomas J. Sargent
- Marc P. Giannoni
- Gary Koop
- Francesco Bianchi
- Luca Gambetti
- Todd E. Clark
- Haroon Mumtaz
Citations in the corpus
- Monetary Policy Inertia: Fact or Fiction? (2006, unknown): “Notably, in Estrella and Mishkin (1999), Peersman and Smets (1999), Shuetrim and Thompson (1999), and Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001), there is no significant attenuation of the rule parameters.”
- Evolving Post-World War II U.S. Inflation Dynamics (2001, background): “…Watson (1994 and 1997), Fair (1996), Eisner (1997), and Ahmed and Rogers (1998) construct tests of long-run neutrality that are predicated on the assumption of a unit root in inflation.1 Estrella and Mishkin (1999) use the Solow-Tobin characterization to estimate the natural rate of unemployment.”
- The quest for prosperity without inflation (2003, unknown): “9 Several authors, including Estrella and Mishkin (1998), Orphanides (1997), McCallum (1998) and Mc- Callum and Nelson (1998) have recently discussed this problem at length.”
- Monetary Policy with Uncertain Parameters (2002, unknown): “Blinder (1997, 1998), Goodhart (1999) and Poole (1998) all stress the relevance of parameter uncertainty for practical monetary policy.”
- Inflation Zone Targeting (2000, unknown): “28This approach closely parallels the modeling of multiplicative uncertainty in Brainard (1967) (see Estrella and Mishkin, 1999, for a recent exposition) but differs from the robust control approach in Sargent (1999) and Onatski and Stock (1999).”
- DOES MODEL UNCERTAINTY JUSTIFY CAUTION? ROBUST OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY IN A FORWARD-LOOKING MODEL (2002, background): “P (f; Ã) = 0; (11) (20)Note however that these constraints do not necessarily eliminate all of the equilibria that result from policies in ~ ana; i.”