Banks, Short Term Debt and Financial Crises: Theory, Policy Implications and Applications

By Douglas W. Diamond, Raghu Rajan. 2001

250 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d1ae53fa8e623701353dbaa6024e5655e4039228

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Citations in the corpus

Liquidity Shortages and Banking Crises (2003, unknown): “As Diamond and Rajan (2001) show, this becomes the source of discipline.”
Has Finance Made the World Riskier (2006, background): “Diamond and Rajan (2001a) argue that it is the credibility obtained from the fragile capital structure C© 2006 The Author Journal compilation C© 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2006 that allows the bank to take on the risks associated with illiquid loans.”
Capital Structure, Profitability and Firm Value: Panel Evidence of Listed Firms in Kenya (2014, unknown): “On the same note, Diamond and Rajan (2000b) argue, from the perspective of bank financing, that the possibility of premature liquidation of short-term debt may act as an incentive to managers to pursue value maximizing decisions that may enhance firm performance.”
Debt Maturity and the International Financial Architecture (2004, unknown): “Similar themes were developed by Diamond and Rajan (2001b) and Tirole (2002, 2003).”
The International Transmission of Bank Liquidity Shocks: Evidence from an Emerging Market (2012, unknown): “Using bank-level data for Latin American and Asian countries, Diamond and Rajan (2001), Peek and Rosengren (2000b), and Detragiache and Gupta (2004), among others, nd that after nancial crises, foreign-owned banks increase lending relative to domestically owned banks.”
Macro-Prudential Policies to Mitigate Financial System Vulnerabilities (2013, background): “This interconnectedness can result in a specific shock to an institution or market at a point in time being amplified as it is propagated throughout the system (see Allen and Gale, 2007; Diamond and Rajan, 2001, Bebchuk and Goldstein, 2012).”
Financial Crises: Explanations, Types, and Implications (2013, unknown): “Diamond and Rajan (2001) posit that banks in developing countries have little choice but to borrow short-term to finance illiquid projects given the low-quality institutional environment they operate in. Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) propose the “original sin” argument explaining how countries…”
Presidential Address, Committing to Commit: Short-term Debt When Enforcement Is Costly (2004, methodology): “Earlier, I discussed the role of externalities across lenders in the models of runs in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001a, 2001b).”
Corporate Governance and Control (2003, unknown): “As Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Diamond and Rajan (2001) have emphasized more 52 Yet another comparative analysis is given in Ayres and Cramton (1994).”