Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style

By Hehui Jin, Yingyi Qian, Barry R. Weingast. 2005

1,189 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1c74c38655fff7a5d13e3e70238067119e5dc1a5

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Citations in the corpus

Fiscal decentralization and regional economic growth: Theory, empirics, and the Russian experience (2015, background): “In other revenue and expenditure at regional and local levels is positively related to eco- and Kroijer, 2009) and creates positive incentives for subnational authorities to preserve market institutions (Jin et al., 2005). for a long period of time.”
Elections, fiscal reform and public goods provision in rural China (2007, background): “Qian and Weingast (1996; 1997) and Jin et al. (2005) argue that the fiscal reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s are among the most influential factors that triggered China’s remarkable economic performance.”
Firm Growth and Corruption: Empirical Evidence from Vietnam (2017, neutral): “FROM VIETNAM*”
The Logic of Authoritarian Bargains (2009, neutral): “and Robinson, 2001; Grossman and Kim, 1995, 1996), public employment (Alesina et al., 2001), fiscal decentralization ( Jin et al., 2005 ), or other benefits designed to shore up public support.”
Does Environmental Information Disclosure Benefit Waste Discharge Reduction? Evidence from China (2014, background): “Several scholars have explained the economic growth of China in terms of politics and economics and have argued that China uses unique approaches to provide strong incentives for local governments (Montinola et al. 1995; Jin et al. 2005; Li and Zhou 2005).”
The tradeoff between growth and equity in decentralization policy: China's experience ☆ (2008, methodology): “5 Jin et al. (1999) note the strong fiscal incentives provided by this reform leading to “market preserving federalism.”
Spillovers and competition among foreign and local firms in China (2008, background): “Roughly speaking, each Chinese province is a regional market; over time, China developed a system of de facto ‘federalism’ and regional decentralization at the provincial level (Jin, Qian, and Weingast, 2005).”
Relative Performance Evaluation and the Turnover of Provincial Leaders in China (2005, background): “The first emphasizes the role of decentralization and high-powered fiscal incentives local governments have during this period (Oi, 1992; Montinola et al., 1995; Jin et al., 2000).”
Land and Urban Economic Growth in China (2011, neutral): “…officials may have better information about local needs, be more responsive to local demand for infrastructure and services, and provide greater support for local business development that central authorities might overlook (Zhang and Zhou, 1998; Lin and Liu, 2001; Jin, Qian, and Weingast, 2005).”