How to Fight Terrorism: Alternatives to Deterrence

By Bruno S. Frey, Simon Luechinger. 2003

317 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d0f7ffb511bc5c3d7ba40f6fc37942586dd967da

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In Sociology and Political Science

Citations in the corpus

Government Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis (2009, background): “…the theory of rational choice, we assume that rational terrorists maximize the expected net benefits of their acts (see Lichbach 1987).4 As Frey and Luechinger (2003, 2004) point out, the incentives of prospective terrorists depend on the (expected) costs, including direct and opportunity costs,…”
Calculating Tragedy: Assessing the Costs of Terrorism (2004, unknown): “Frey et al. (2004) calculate a hypothetical willingness-to-pay of a resident of Northern Ireland for a reduction in the number of fatalities to the average level of Great Britain and the”
A DYNAMICAL MODEL OF TERRORISM (2006, unknown): “Copyright © 2006 Firdaus Udwadia et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.”
Decentralization as a disincentive for terror (2004, background): “For further references, see also Frey and Luechinger (2003) and Frey (2004). terrorism-experts is often unfavourable.2 Hoffman (1998, p. 61), for example, claims that countless times ‘‘attempts by the ruling regime to deter further violence [. . .] backfired catastrophically’’.”
Does Terror Threaten Human Rights? Evidence from Panel Data (2007, methodology): “For an extensive summary on the various effects of terrorism see Frey et al. (2007). For a theoretical model of the macroeconomic effects and an empirical application see Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004). We extract the number of terror events for each country and year as our variable of main interest.”
The Origins of Terrorism - Cross-Country Estimates on Socio-Economic Determinants of Terrorism (2011, methodology): “…their short-run or long-run goals, where the short-run goals are a destabilization of attacked economies and polities as well as publicity (e.g., Tavares 2004) and the long-run goal is a redistribution of power and wealth not enforceable in the ordinary political process (Frey and Luechinger 2003).”
Causal Linkages Between Domestic Terrorism and Economic Growth (2011, background): “In general, we provide support for policies that aim at increasing the opportunity costs of terror, as e.g., advocated by Frey and Luechinger (2003).”
TERROR SUPPORT AND RECRUITMENT (2005, background): “In this way we are able to assess Frey and Luechinger’s (2003) argument that alternative antiterrorism policies exist that are superior to deterrence for raising terrorists’ opportunity costs.”
The life satisfaction approach to valuing public goods: The case of terrorism (2009, background): “…are estimated and monetized for 1For an overview and further references on the economics of terrorism, see e.g. Enders and Sandler (1995), Frey and Luechinger (2003), Frey (2004), Enders and Sandler (2006) or the special issue of Public Choice on terrorism with contributions by…”
Balancing Terrorism and Natural Disasters - Defensive Strategy with Endogenous Attacker Effort (2007, background): “The 9/11 Commission Report National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004, p. 383”