Decentralization as a disincentive for terror
By Bruno S. Frey, Simon Luechinger. 2004
122 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8cd55d477fd9262392369b4f5d89681ec4820822
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Sociology and Political Science
- Friedrich Schneider
- Jens J. Krüger
- Andreas Freytag
- Vicki M. Bier
- Jun Zhuang
- Daniel Meierrieks
- Seung-Whan Choi
Citations in the corpus
- The economic effects of federalism and decentralization—a cross-country assessment (2010, unknown): “6 Frey and Luechinger (2004) have made the opposite argument with regard to one specific type of instability, namely that induced by terrorism.”
- The Origins of Terrorism - Cross-Country Estimates on Socio-Economic Determinants of Terrorism (2011, background): “As long as terrorists’ marginal benefits exceed marginal costs, terror is chosen as a tool to reach political objectives (Frey and Luechinger 2004).”
- Government Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis (2009, unknown): “According to Frey and Luechinger (2004), terrorists pursue three main goals: get the attention of the media, destabilize the target country’s polity, and impose damage on the 2 Regarding the determinants of terror in the terrorists’ countries of origin see Freytag, Krüger and Schneider (2006).”
- Balancing Terrorism and Natural Disasters - Defensive Strategy with Endogenous Attacker Effort (2007, background): “We recognize that this assumption is limiting, as pointed out by Guikema (2007). However, as stated previously, we view this paper as only one of several building blocks needed for a more complete understanding of strategic defense against terrorism.”
- Calculating Tragedy: Assessing the Costs of Terrorism (2004, unknown): “On the other hand, anti-terrorism policies, based on positive incentives (Frey and Luechinger, 2003, 2004), entail positive externalities for other countries.”