The Effectiveness of Regulation FD

By Andreas Gintschel, Stanimir Markov. 2004

311 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d025ceb2c3089d1c3088932c5850362184b428a6

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Citations in the corpus

Have Financial Markets Become More Informative (2016, unknown): “4Bushee, Matsumoto, and Miller (2004), Gintschel and Markov (2004), and Eleswarapu, Thompson, and Venkataraman (2004), find a decrease in bid-ask spreads after Reg.”
Large Sample Evidence on the Informativeness of Text in Analyst Reports (2012, background): “quality has deteriorated since the private communications between managers and analysts have been prohibited, consistent with the findings in the extant literature (e.g., Francis, Nanda and Wang 2006; Gintschel and Markov 2004).”
Information asymmetry, information dissemination and the effect of regulation FD on the cost of capital (2008, unknown): “…Li, Mao, and Zhong (2003), and Straser (2002) argue that firms increased disclosures after Regulation FD. Bushee, Matsumoto, and Miller (2004), Gintschel and Markov (2004), Topaloglu (2003), Eleswarapu, Thompson, and Venkataraman (2004), and Chiyachantana, Jiang, Taechapiroontong, and Wood…”
The Economics of Conflicts of Interest in Financial Institutions (2006, unknown): “With ARTICLE IN PRESS 7 For an analyst's perspective on being brought over the wall, see Reingold and Reingold (2006).”
The Economics of Disclosure and Financial Reporting Regulation: Evidence and Suggestions for Future Research (2015, unknown): “Gintschel and Markov (2004) find that the informativeness of analyst reports as measured by their price impact upon release declines after Reg FD and that this decline is concentrated in growth firms.”
Analysts’ Forecasts and Asset Pricing: A Survey (2016, unknown): “For instance, studies have shown that analysts’ forecasts have become less precise (Gintschel and Markov, 2004; Agrawal, Chadha, and Chen, 2006), analysts’ forecast dispersion has increased (Bailey et al.”
Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting and Disclosure Regulation: A Review and Suggestions for Future Research (2008, unknown): “For instance, Gintschel and Markov (2004) show a reduction in the price impact of information disseminated by analysts.”
Analyst following along the supply chain (2011, unknown): “…of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), which became effective on October 23, 2000, to address selective disclosures of material non-public information to security analysts and institutional investors (e.g., Heflin et al. 2003; 15 Bailey et al. 2003; Markov and Gintschel 2004; Agrawal et al. 2006).”
Access to Management and the Informativeness of Analyst Research (2014, background): “Earnings forecast and recommendation changes that move away from the consensus (i.e., bold changes) lead to larger price impacts (Gleason and Lee, 2003; and Jegadeesh and Kim, 2010).”
The Financial Analyst Forecasting Literature: A Taxonomy with Suggestions for Further Research (2008, unknown): “With respect to pricing effects, research generally suggests that price impacts have decreased after Reg FD, and that the decreases are related to the level of selective disclosure pre-Reg FD, as proxied by brokerage and firm characteristics (e.g., Gintschel & Markov, 2004).”
Re-Examining the Effects of Regulation Fair Disclosure using Foreign Listed Firms to Control for Concurrent Shocks (2006, unknown): “Finally, in terms of the newsworthiness of analysts’ reports (as measured by the absolute price impact of the analyst’s report on the day it was issued), prior research finds that the average price impact of analysts’ reports is significantly lower in the post-Reg FD periods relative to pre-Reg FD p”
Informational Effects of Regulation Fd: Evidence from Rating Agencies (2005, background): “Also, Gintschel and Markov (2003) show that the absolute price impact of information disseminated by analysts dampened in the post-FD period.”
On the Information Role of Stock Recommendation Revisions (2009, background): “Studies generally conclude that Reg FD reduced the amount of selective disclosure (Agrawal et al., 2006; Bailey et al., 2003; Gintschel and Markov, 2004; Goff et al., 2008).”