Controlling shareholder, expropriations and firm's leverage decision: Evidence from Chinese Non-tradable share reform

By Qigui Liu, Gary Gang Tian. 2012

276 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cfc9daa23e5cc1ee3b58171e8d9152285172146d

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Citations in the corpus

Multiple large shareholders, excess leverage and tunneling: evidence from an emerging market (2017, unknown): “To test hypothesis 2, we follow Jiang et al. (2010), Liu and Tian (2012), and Qian and Yeung (2015) and use “other receivables” as a proxy for intercorporate loan tunneling.”
Value relevance, earnings management and corporate governance in China (2015, background): “…used to manipulate earnings for financial reporting (Aharony et al., 2010b; Jian and Wong, 2010; Lo et al., 2010a; Wong et al., 2015), and good corporate governance mechanisms could moderate the level of tunneling in China (Gao and Kling, 2008; Jiang et al., 2010; Liu and Tian, 2012; Shan, 2013).”
The Real and Accrual-based Earnings Management Behaviors: Evidence from the Split Share Structure Reform in China (2014, methodology): “…corporate governance and improves the quantity of corporate financial information (see also Section 2.1 for more details).3 For instance, Liu and Tian (2012) indicate that both tunneling and excess leverage by controlling shareholders with excess control rights have been reduced after…”
Foreign institutional investors and corporate governance in emerging markets: Evidence of a split-share structure reform in China (2015, background): “Liu and Tian (2012) studied whether the excess leverage in firms with excess control rights changed following the split-share structure reform.”
Family control and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China (2015, background): “As discussed above, excess control rights in emerging markets usually destroy firm value because controlling shareholders tend to expropriate the interests of minority shareholders, especially in countries with poor shareholder protection system (Claessens et al., 2002; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Faccio”