Is the International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Regulation Desirable

By V. Acharya. 2003

235 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cee477222d7bbd2fad837afac6399a314015d6ba

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Citations in the corpus

Banks without Parachutes – Competitive Effects of Government Bail-out Policies (2010, unknown): “(2)A similar mechanism has been used by Acharya (2003) to model international spill-overs between banking systems governed by different regulations.”
A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation (2009, unknown): “Systemic risk arises as an endogenous consequence when in equilibrium, banks prefer to lend to similar industries.(2) Since deposit contract is not explicitly contingent on bank characteristics, the depositor losses resulting from bank failures are not internalized by the bankowners.”
Bank size and risk-taking under Basel II (2005, unknown): “The modelling approach closest to ours is by Acharya (2003).”
Cross-Border Banking in Europe: Implications for Financial Stability and Macroeconomic Policies (2011, background): “Similarly, Acharya and Schnabl (2010) show that the major global banks took the same risks in asset-backed commercial paper and therefore faced similar problems rolling over during the crisis in 2008.”
Reputational Contagion and Optimal Regulatory Forbearance (2013, unknown): “Whilst common regulation has many benefits (Acharya 2003, Morrison and White 2009), our model shows that it also has a cost.”
Cooperation in International Banking Supervision (2004, unknown): “Acharya (2003), for example, shows that competition in capital standards may result in a race-to-bottom as regulators attempt to further the competitive position of their domestic banks.”
Regulatory Arbitrage and Cross-Border Bank Acquisitions: Regulatory Arbitrage and Cross-Border Bank Acquisitions (2015, unknown): “6 Acharya (2003) models how international convergence of bank capital requirements can lead to unintended “race to the bottom” equilibria if not accompanied by consistent resolution policies across regimes. Banks that operate across borders will undertake greater risk in more forbearing regimes whic”
Where the Risks Lie: A Survey on Systemic Risk (2017, unknown): “Acharya (2003) points out that this might not be enough, as closure policies must also be coordinated.”