Hard and Soft Law in International Governance

By Kenneth W. Abbott, D. Snidal. International Organization, 2000

2,069 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Law, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ceb270da9828975c3067a701a79845c1f9ee8ae7

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate Governance Deviance (2016, positive): “In economies where shareholder-oriented governance logic prevails, corporate governance regulation is typically explicit, and the coercive sanctions for violating regulations are precise (Abbott & Snidal, 2000).”
When Do Numbers Count? The Differential Impact of the PISA Rating and Ranking on Education Policy in Germany and the US (2013, background): “From a governance viewpoint, comparisons illustrate that power is not wielded solely by traditional top-down regulatory activities but also by apparently soft comparative R&R such as those of IOs.14 The parties evaluated are implicitly pressured to converge towards those practices, forms of organisa”
The Financial Secrecy Index: Shedding New Light on the Geography of Secrecy (2015, background): “Over the last decades, international efforts at enhancing cooperation in financial matters have increased either by hard international law or through best practice standards and associated evaluations of their implementation (soft law; Abbott and Snidal 2000).”
Nested and overlapping regimes in the transatlantic banana trade dispute (2006, background): “Others analyze factors influencing what type of institutional forum is chosen (Abbott and Snidal 1998 , 2000 ; McCall Smith 2000 ).”
Coordinating in the Shadow of the Law: Two Contextualized Tests of the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance (2008, background): “That ‘‘soft law’’ (Abbott & Snidal 2000) frequently influences states and private actors should also be no surprise if the causal mechanism is focal power.”
In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO (2002, background): “See, for example, Raustiala and Victor 1998; and Abbott and Snidal 2000.”
Ratification counts: US investment treaties and FDI flows into developing countries (2010, background): “This is particularly so if one accepts the claim that such institutions allow governments to tie their hands to a set of domestic policies ( Abbott and Snidal, 2000 ; Guzman, 2005 ).”
The International Law and Politics of Climate Change Ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol (2008, background): “…agreements they have cast as legally binding because (1) they recognize a stronger obligation, under the principle of pacta sunt servanda, to abide (Abbott et al. 2000, 409), and/or (2) the reputational costs of violating hard law may be higher than the reputational costs of violating soft law…”
Operationalizing the Concept of Policy Space in the WTO: Beyond Special and Differential Treatment (2005, neutral): “12 E.g., Abbott and Snidal, 2000; Chayes and Chayes, 1995; Helleiner, 2000; Finger, 2002, Sabel and Reddy, 2002.”
Private Global Business Regulation (2008, background): “States have often chosen softer forms of governance as a way of facilitating international cooperation because of the significant costs and limitations of enacting legally binding standards (Abbott & Snidal 2000, Shelton 2000, Morth 2004).”
The EU and the new trade politics (2006, background): “As the contributions by De Bièvre (2006) and Shaffer (2006) concur, the Uruguay Round (and the MAI) also represented a marked increase in the legalization of trade policy (see also Abbott and Snidal 2000; Keohane et al. 2000).”