Corporate Social Responsibility and Managerial Entrenchment

By Giovanni Cespa, Giacinta Cestone. 2007

504 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cea34b9f628c6c2dce345f06f538fa349dfac8e4

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation for Corporate Social Responsibility (2015, unknown): “…al., 2014; Cheng et al., 2014; Kruger, 2014; Masulis and Reza, 2014), provide added job security to inefficient managers by pleasing stakeholders (Cespa and Cestone, 2007), compensate for the negative consequences of engaging in earnings management (Prior et al., 2008), and enhance individual…”
Agency Problems of Corporate Philanthropy (2015, background): “Cespa and Cestone (2007) argue that CEOs use corporate resources strategically to build ties with stakeholders to receive favorable treatment during future contract renewal or turnover decisions.”
Corporate social responsibility, firm value, and influential institutional ownership (2018, background): “responsible behavior consistent with value-maximizing interests of investors? Put another way, does CSR help to enhance firm value? The “overinvestment hypothesis” suggests a negative relation between CSR and firm value (Cespa and Cestone, 2007; Barnea and Rubin, 2010).”
Corporate social responsibility disclosures and earnings quality: Are they a reflection of managers’ opportunistic behavior? (2015, background): “Promoting CSR activities can help a manager secure his/her job by avoiding close scrutiny by stakeholder activists (Cespa and Cestone, 2007).”
Corporate Goodness and Shareholder Wealth (2015, background): “Cespa and Cestone (2007) provide a theoretical argument along these lines.”
Customer Satisfaction and Brand Equity (2011, unknown): “Second, if managers satisfy customers as well as noncustomer stakeholders, the resulting policy may represent an entrenchment strategy that a manager implements when confronted with dissatisfied shareholders (Cespa and Cestone, 2007; Surroca and Tribó, 2008).”
Are Socially Responsible Managers Really Ethical? Exploring the Relationship between Earnings Management and Corporate Social Responsibility (2008, methodology): “Under such a scheme, CSR is used as an entrenchment mechanism (Cespa and Cestone, 2007) in the context of earnings manipulation.”
Analyst Coverage, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Firm Risk (2014, background): “Cespa & Cestone (2007) propose a theoretical model investigating the conflicts of interest among managers, shareholders, and other noninvesting stakeholders, even when managers are not performing.”
Public Sentiment and the Price of Corporate Sustainability (2020, unknown): “Theoretical models show how managers can buy employee support by adopting more employee-friendly workplace practices to avoid replacement (Cespa and Cestone 2007) or takeovers (Pagano and Volpin 2005).”
Corporate social responsibility and bank efficiency (2020, background): “, 2019) and increased power within the firm (Cespa and Cestone, 2007; Surroca and Tribó, 2008).”