The Explanatory Force of Dynamical and Mathematical Models in Neuroscience: A Mechanistic Perspective*

By David M. Kaplan, Carl F. Craver. Philosophia Scientiæ, 2011

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Moving Beyond Causes: Optimality Models and Scientific Explanation (2015, methodology): “…represent some of the actual causes (or causal mechanisms) in the event’s causal history.3 This striving for accurate representation of salient causes is also present in a prominent approach to using models as explanations (Craver 2006; Kaplan and Craver 2011; Potochnik 2007; Strevens 2009).”
Minimal Model Explanations (2014, background): “Accuracy requirements are prominent in various accounts that claim that only mechanistic models explain ðCraver 2006; Kaplan 2011; Kaplan and Craver 2011Þ. Mechanistic accounts typically place extremely strict accuracy conditions on explanatory models by requiring that the model accurately describe…”