Social norms and conditional cooperative taxpayers

By Christian Traxler. 2010

270 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Gender Studies

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ce704a8409a3534ca3e0d9439a558bddadff6753

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Citations in the corpus

WHAT MOTIVATES TAX COMPLIANCE? (2018, unknown): “In related approaches, Myles and Naylor (1996), Kim (2003), Fortin, Lacroix, and Villeval (2007), and Traxler (2010) introduce in the individual’s decision reputational effects via social customs and social interactions, and demonstrate that these effects can generate multiple equilibria, some with…”
Norms, moods, and free lunch: Longitudinal evidence on payments from a Pay-What-You-Want restaurant (2012, background): “8 See Akerlof (1980) for a classical model on social norms, as well as Azar (2004, 007), Balestrino and Ciardi (2008), Lopez-Perez (2009), Mengel (2008) or Traxler 2010) for more recent contributions.”
APPLICATIONS OF BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS TO TAX EVASION (2012, background): “Journal of Economic Surveys (2013) Vol. 27, No. 5, pp. 941–977 C© 2012 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Traxler (2010) modifies the analysis by assuming the social custom is a loss of utility when evading.”
The Behavioralist as Tax Collector: Using Natural Field Experiments to Enhance Tax Compliance (2017, background): “Various studies have proposed that giving information about the prevalence of compliance could increase the moral costs of non-compliance (Traxler, 2010; Myles & Naylor 1996; Frey & Torgler, 2007).”
From the Lab to the Field: A Review of Tax Experiments (2016, unknown): “This observation has spurred researchers to include other factors in the model, such as social and moral considerations, which are likely to affect the decision to evade (Erard and Feinstein, 1994; Myles and Naylor, 1996; Traxler, 2010).”
Representative evidence on lying costs (2014, background): “1992), patriotism (Konrad & Qari 2012), religiosity (Torgler 2006), fairness (Bordignon 1993), conditional cooperation (Traxler 2010) or honesty (Erard & Feinstein 1994).”
Tax Compliance and Enforcement in the Pampas: Evidence from a Field Experiment (2013, background): “Then, following Traxler (2010), the optimization problem can be formulated as follows 𝑈(𝑒𝑖,𝜃𝑖) = 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥(𝑒𝑖))]− 𝜃𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑐(𝑛) where e, the share of tax being evaded, is the variable of choice of the individual, the first term is the traditional expected utility term coming from the AS and…”
The effect of tax enforcement on tax morale (2013, unknown): “Similarly, Traxler andWinter (2012) report that the frequency of the occurrence of a norm violation negatively affects individuals' inclination to punish the violation. Our paper contributes to the stream of literature that improves the understanding of the determinants of tax morale focusing on con”
Status Concerns as a Motive for Crime? (2015, background): “Other social interaction models (such as Glaeser et al. (1996), Sah (1991), Schrag and Scotchmer (1997), Silverman (2004), and Traxler (2010)), rely on different reasons to explain this interdependence.”
Leaders as role models and ‘belief managers’ in social dilemmas (2018, background): “Traxler (2010) provides a theoretical analysis of the implications of conditional cooperation for tax evasion.”