Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China
By Hongbin Li, Li-an Zhou. 2005
3,296 citations recorded by the source corpus.
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the incentive role of personnel control in post-reform China. Employing the turnover data of top provincial leaders in China between 1979 and 1995, we find that the likelihood of promotion of provincial leaders increases with their economic performance, while the likelihood of termination decreases with their economic performance. This finding is robust to various sensitivity tests. We also find that the turnover of provincial leaders is more sensitive to their average performance over their tenure than to their annual performance. We interpret these empirical findings as evidence that China uses personnel control to induce desirable economic outcomes. Our study adds some basic evidence to a growing theoretical literature emphasizing the role of political incentives of government officials in promoting local economic growth.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cd469bee29ed4a72e650e8999c118648369ea8cc
How researchers see this paper
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In Economics and Econometrics
- Siqi Zheng
- Matthew E. Kahn
- Zheng Song
- Michael Greenstone
- Jun Zhang
- Edward L. Glaeser
- Junyan Jiang
- Ting Chen
In Political Science and International Relations
- James Kai Sing Kung
- E. Lichtenberg
- Canfei He
- Ting Chen
- Ran Tao
- Zhiji Huang
- Matthew E. Kahn
- Fubing Su
Citations in the corpus
- Political Incentives to Suppress Negative Information: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms (2015, background): “Chen, Li, and Zhou [2005] and Li and Zhou [2005] find that provincial leaders' promotions and demotions are significantly associated with the change in economic performance of their province.”
- Mandate Versus Championship: Vertical government intervention and diffusion of innovation in public services in authoritarian China (2014, background): “Such a career-oriented system for local officials based on performance evaluation tends to push local officials into developing their local economy (Li and Zhou 2005; Maskin et al. 2000; Whiting 2001).”
- Local officials as land developers: Urban spatial expansion in China (2009, background): “Central and provincial government oversight was strengthened in 1998 by revisions to the land administration law establishing stringent administrative restrictions on farmland conversion (Lin and Ho, 2005; Lichtenberg and Ding, 2008).”
- Institutional Innovations, Asymmetric Decentralization, and Local Economic Development: A Case Study of Kunshan, in Post-Mao China (2007, background): “In addition, Li and Zhou (2005) also conclude that Chinese central government tended to terminate provincial officials who performed badly in local economic development: the higher the economic growth rates relative to those under the immediate predecessor, the less likely the provincial official ”
- Making Bureaucracy Work: Patronage Networks, Performance Incentives, and Economic Development in China (2018, background): “The predominant narrative on China’s economic success to date focuses on its formal, merit-based institutions, such as interjurisdictional tournaments and the cadre evaluation system (e.g., Li and Zhou 2005; Xu 2011).”
- Evidence on the impact of sustained exposure to air pollution on life expectancy from China’s Huai River policy (2013, background): “First, for the period of our study, government officials’ evaluations were primarily based on economic growth rather than environmental indices (13).”
- Property rights protection and corporate R&D: Evidence from China (2010, result): “This finding echoes the recent study by Li and Zhou (2005) who find that government officials have a political incentive to promote local economic growth.”
- Political uncertainty and cash holdings: Evidence from China (2016, background): “The top two leaders at the city level are the city’s Communist Party Secretary and the mayor, reflecting the dual presence of the Communist Party and the government at each level of China’s political hierarchy (Li and Zhou, 2005).”