Aggregation in Matching Markets

By J. Dagsvik. 2000

131 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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The Revealed Preference Theory of Stable and Extremal Stable Matchings (2010, unknown): “To lay some necessary groundwork, we first study stability in a general model of population matching; including, as special cases, aggregate (Choo and Siow, 2006; Dagsvik, 2000), and random matching (Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979; Roth, Rothblum, and Vande Vate, 1993; Alkan and Gale, 2003).”
A discrete choice model for labor supply and childcare (2002, result): “This is in accordance with reasoning in Dagsvik and Strom (2005), based on results from Dagsvik (2000) .”
Who Marries Whom and Why (2006, background): “If we let …ij = lnƒij = fiij+∞ij 2 , we can rewrite Equation ( 14 ) as:”
Cupid’s Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models (2015, unknown): “The literature on markets with non-transferable utility has evolved separately, with some interesting similarities—in particular with Menzel (2015)’s investigation of large NTU markets, building on a model of Dagsvik (2000).”
Partner Choice, Investment in Children, and the Marital College Premium (2017, methodology): “While it has been used in economics since Daniel McFadden (1973), Dagsvik (2000) and Choo and Siow (2006) were the first to apply it to the study of marriage markets. level—that is, the gain that accrues to married people, on top of the benefits that singles also receive.”