Who Marries Whom and Why

By Eugene Choo, A. Siow. Journal of Political Economy, 2006

672 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Gender Studies, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3975284c2565c47165a441a4013df8dde1b20e36

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Citations in the corpus

The Marriage Market, Labor Supply, and Education Choice (2015, neutral): “Given the conditional instantaneous indirect utilities in (17)-(18), it is easy to show by recursion that the additive separability of the Pareto weight carries over to earlier periods:”
Fatter Attraction: Anthropometric and Socioeconomic Matching on the Marriage Market (2012, positive): “Following the seminal, theoretical contribution by Shimer and Smith (2000), several empirical contributions (Choo and Siow, 2006; Chiappori, Salanié and Weiss, 2010) introduce randomness into the matching process, to account for the deviations from perfectly assortative matching that characterize…”
What makes you click?—Mate preferences in online dating (2010, background): “Our work is also related to a literature that estimates mate preferences from observations on marriages using equilibrium restrictions of marriage market models (e.g., Choo and Siow 2006; Wong 2003).”
Matching and Sorting in Online Dating (2010, neutral): “Our work is related to recent structural econometric work that estimates mate preferences based on marriage data ( Linda Y. Wong 2003; Eugene Choo and Aloysius Siow 2006; Christopher J. Flinn and Daniela del Boca 2006 .”
Social Change: The Sexual Revolution (2009, positive): “25 Interestingly, Choo and Siow (2006) estimate, using an non-transferable utility model of the U.S. marriage market, that the gains for marriage accruing to young adults fell sharply between 1971 and 1981.”
Cupid’s Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models (2015, positive): “We show in Galichon and Salanié (2021) that in the case of the Choo and Siow (2006) model, the moment matching estimator can be reformulated as a generalized linear model and estimated by a Poisson regression with two-sided fixed effects.”
Educational Assortative Mating and Household Income Inequality (2019, background): “Given this identification challenge, empiricalmodels of assortativemating typically consider a frictionless environment (see, e.g., Choo and Siow 2006).”
Sorting Multidimensional Types: Theory and Application (2017, neutral): “Contrary to Costinot and Vogel [2010] and Acemoglu and Autor [2011], there is no intensive margin here.”
Personality Traits and the Marriage Market (2014, background): “PERSONALITY TRAITS AND THE MARRIAGE MARKET 3 to this limitation, empirical studies to date have therefore either focused on one attribute at a time, hence ignoring the e⁄ect of other attributes on sorting (see e.g. Charles et al., 2011), or assumed that all observed attributes matter but only…”
Counterfactual Sensitivity and Robustness (2019, background): “Gumbel (type-I extreme value) assumption for the distribution of individuals’ idiosyncratic marital preferences (see also Choo and Siow (2006)).”
Complementarity and Aggregate Implications of Assortative Matching: A Nonparametric Analysis (2014, neutral): “While Choo and Siow (2006a, 2006b) made a number of strong distributional assumptions, they attractively assumed that the observed assignment corresponds to a pairwise stable matching equilibrium (cf. Fox (2010a)).6 Let i index firms with (for simplicity) the binary observable characteristic Wi ∈ W…”
Partner Choice, Investment in Children, and the Marital College Premium (2017, methodology): “We then embed the model into a Transferable Utility matching framework with random preferences à la Choo and Siow (2006) which we estimate on US marriage data for individuals born between 1943 and 1972.”