Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data

By R. Erikson, Thomas R. Palfrey. American Political Science Review, 2000

222 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Clientelism and vote buying: lessons from field experiments in African elections (2009, background): “Later Green and Krasno (1988), Levitt (1994), Gerber (1998), and Erikson and Palfrey (2000), found that effectiveness of campaign spending is comparable across incumbents and challengers and close to zero.”
Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics (2006, background): “Most papers concentrate on implications for the probability of winning of incumbent vs. challenger candidates (Levitt [20], Erikson and Palfrey [ 14 ]) or on the amount of campaign contributions (Baye, Kovenock, and DeVries [6], Che and Gale [9]).”
Primaries and the New Hampshire Effect (2006, unknown): “Hence, candidates play a variant of an all pay auction, where (11) determines the winner.”
How Words and Money Cultivate a Personal Vote: The Effect of Legislator Credit Claiming on Constituent Credit Allocation (2012, methodology): “Given that we lack a plausible instrument (Gerber 1998), we use a substratification research design analogous to that employed in Erikson and Palfrey (2000).”