Economic voting: The effect of political context, volatility and turnout on voters’ assignment of responsibility

By Åsa Bengtsson. 2004

111 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cc1ff896176b8da9a44d4ab0491b188e74ffb48b

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. S. Hobolt
2. James Tilley
3. Susan Banducci
4. Michael S. Lewis-Beck
5. C. Anderson
6. Mary Stegmaier
7. R. Dassonneville
8. Mark A. Kayser

In Political Science and International Relations

1. S. Hobolt
2. James Tilley
3. Michael S. Lewis-Beck
4. Susan Banducci
5. R. Dassonneville
6. C. Anderson
7. Mary Stegmaier
8. Mark A. Kayser

In Strategy and Management

1. Michael S. Lewis-Beck
2. James Tilley
3. S. Hobolt
4. R. Dassonneville
5. C. Anderson
6. Susan Banducci
7. Mary Stegmaier
8. Mark A. Kayser

Citations in the corpus

• Clarity of responsibility: How government cohesion conditions performance voting (2013, background): “(Powell & Whitten 1993: 406) This clarity of responsibility index has become very influential in political science and has been widely used to explain variation in performance voting (Whitten & Palmer 1999; Anderson 2000; Kiewiet 2000; Powell 2000; Nadeau et al. 2002; Bengtsson 2004; Samuels 2004; H”
• Macroeconomics, economic crisis and electoral outcomes: A national European pool (2014, background): “These aggregate analyses may uncover statistically significant relationships between an objective economic indicator and incumbent vote support, but they can be substantively weak (Bengtsson, 2004; Chappell and Veiga, 2000; Fidrmuc, 2000; Paldam, 1991; Powell and Whitten, 1993; Tufte, 1978).”
• The VP-function revisited: a survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after over 40 years (2013, background): “However, we are more concerned about multi-nation macro-models, of which there are fewer (Bellucci and Lewis-Beck 2011; Bengtsson 2004; Benton 2005; Carlsen 2000; Chappell and Veiga 2000; Fidrmuc 2000; Pacek 1994; Pacek and Radcliff 1995; Paldam 1991; Powell and Whitten 1993; Remmer 1991; Roberts 20”
• The End of Economic Voting? Contingency Dilemmas and the Limits of Democratic Accountability (2007, background): “A more clearly defined set of viable alternatives to the incumbent government should lead citizens to more readily express content or discontent with the ruling party or parties (Bengtsson 2004).”