Inference of Signs of Interaction Effects in Simultaneous Games with Incomplete Information

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Econometric Analysis of Games with Multiple Equilibria (2012, background): “For games with more than two players, de Paula & Tang (2012) rely on this result to suggest a test for the hypothesis that there aremultiple solutions in the data and, conditional on there being more than one equilibrium, on the sign of Di, i¼ 1, 2.”
Discrete games with flexible information structures: an application to local grocery markets (2014, background): “…paper on multiplicity in games of pure incomplete information uses this fact to develop a test for multiplicity based on conditional independence (Paula and Tang, 2010). expressed either as a vector of cutoffs (χ1(x, θ), χ2(x, θ)) or entry probabilities (%1(x, θ), %2(x, θ)), which are related…”
Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information (2011, unknown): “For example, in Paula and Tang (2010), the conditional independence assumption is used to characterize the joint action equilibrium distribution in terms of the marginal probabilities of every action.”