Coevolution of teaching activity promotes cooperation

By Attila Szolnoki, Matjaz Perc. 2008

310 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Evolutionary games are studied where the teaching activity of players can evolve in time. Initially all players following either the cooperative or defecting strategy are distributed on a square lattice. The rate of strategy adoption is determined by the payoff difference and a teaching activity characterizing the donor's capability to enforce its strategy on the opponent. Each successful strategy adoption process is accompanied by an increase in the donor's teaching activity. By applying an optimum value of the increment, this simple mechanism spontaneously creates relevant inhomogeneities in the teaching activities that support the maintenance of cooperation for both the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game.

Subfields: Genetics, Sociology and Political Science, Statistical and Nonlinear Physics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cbe53678400680de2f66f3ccabb94b9a2370a056

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Citations in the corpus

Evolutionary game theory: Temporal and spatial effects beyond replicator dynamics (2009, result): “This was pioneered by Harley [150] (see also the book by Maynard Smith [6], where the paper by Harley is presented as a chapter) and a few works have appeared in the last few years [151, 152, 153, 154, 155]; although the available results are too specific to allow for a glimpse of any general featur”
Win-Stay-Lose-Learn Promotes Cooperation in the Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma Game (2012, background): “Somewhat more personallyinspired features supporting the evolution of cooperation involve memory effects [49], heterogeneous teaching activity [50–52], preferential learning [53,54], mobility [55–59], myopically selective interactions [60], and coevolutionary partner choice [61–63], to name but a fe”
Coevolutionary games - A mini review (2009, unknown): “Fb”