Environment and Statecraft

By Scott Barrett. 2003

327 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Global and Planetary Change, Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cbd981b48f447b47507685839fa70351d85a6fff

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Citations in the corpus

Institutional ecological economics (2005, background): “These insights can be used, for example, to examine the behaviour of interest groups in international political arenas where collective environmental decisions are made and in the design of local resource strategies for multiple use resources (Barrett, 2003).”
Systematic uncertainty in self-enforcing international environmental agreements (2007, background): “The subsequent section of the paper presents a standard model of self7 One of the most comprehensive recent treatments of this topic is Barrett (2003).”
Stranded Assets in the Transition to a Carbon-Free Economy (2020, background): “This requires rich countries to compensate poor countries to implement a tough climate policy with uniform carbon prices throughout the global economy (Chichilniski and Heal, 1994) and negotiations where everyone is willing to sign the climate deal (e.g. Barrett, 2006).”
International technology-oriented agreements to address climate change (2008, background): “Barrett (2003) calls this the tipping point: once the number of ratifying countries reached a certain threshold, the number of tankers equipped with specified technologies grew rapidly.”
Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements (2012, background): “What are the consequences of the fact that such agreements are often “incomplete contracts” that specify 1 This information and the information presented below are derived from the rich data set on IEAs presented in Barrett ð2003Þ.”
Implementing Long-Term Climate Policy: Time Inconsistency, Domestic Politics, International Anarchy (2009, background): “Barrett 2003, 386; and Hovi 2009.”
Self-enforcing international environmental agreements revisited (2006, background): “…have been developed, for instance, by Ecchia and Mariotti (1997,1998), Ray and Vohra (2001) and Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2002b); see Finus (2001) and Wagner (2001) for excellent overviews, and, more recently, Barrett (2003) for a broad exposition of the strategy of environmental treaty-making.”
Thirteen plus one: a comparison of global climate policy architectures (2003, background): “The constraint of sovereignty, however, may make this ideal unattainable (Barrett, 2003).12 One alternative is a “narrow-but-deep” agreement—one that achieves substantial per-party mitigation, but attracts relatively little participation.”
Paris: Beyond the Climate Dead End through Pledge and Review? (2016, background): “In simplified form, the climate problem resembles the classic Prisoners Dilemma (Barrett, 2003), in which the option of not cooperating typically is more attractive than cooperation.”
What Should We Expect from Innovation? A Model-Based Assessment of the Environmental and Mitigation Cost Implications of Climate-Related R&D (2010, background): “Innovation strategies have also been analysed in the context of climate coalition formation, suggesting that they are indispensable for improving the robustness of international agreements to control climate change (Barrett, 2003).”
Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties (2009, unknown): “…the recent theoretical literature on international agreements, the decision of countries to sign a treaty is often modelled as a two-stage game (see Barrett, 1997b, 2002; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1998; Tulkens, 1998; Carraro and Galeotti, 2002; Carraro and Marchiori, 2002; Finus, 2002, for a few…”
On the Provision of Public Goods with Probabilistic and Ambiguous Thresholds (2015, background): “Rather than striving for the global firstbest solution we may have to settle on a number of second-best measures which are easier to enforce (Barrett 2003).”