Electoral accountability and tax mimicking: the effects of electoral margins, coalition government, and ideology

By A. Ollé. 2003

260 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cb7b83073e106ed704a8339c3b38b35dc3f4768c

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Economics and Econometrics

In Political Science and International Relations

Citations in the corpus

Strategic Tax Competition in Switzerland: Evidence from a Panel of the Swiss Cantons (2009, unknown): “…is provided by HEYNDELS and VUCHELEN (1998) for Belgian municipalities, BÜTTNER (2001) for German local jurisdictions, BORDIGNON, CERNIGLIA and REVELLI (2003) for Italian municipalities, SOLÉ-OLLÉ (2003) for Spanish communities and FELD, JOSSELIN and ROCABOY (2003) for a panel of French regions.”
Yardstick competition and the political costs of raising taxes: An empirical analysis of Spanish municipalities (2007, unknown): “Yardstick competition was originally proposed by Shleifer (1985) as a way of improving the regulation schemes of franchise monopolies, and was first applied to the analysis of competition between sub-national governments by Salmon (1987).”
Public spending interactions and local politics. Empirical evidence from French municipalities (2008, methodology): “These empirical results were obtained using European subnational governments datasets (for example, Heyndels and Vuchelen 1998, in Belgium; Buettner 2001, in Germany; Feld and Reulier 2005, in Switzerland; Bordignon et al. 2003, in Italy; Solé-Ollé 2003, in Spain, and Feld et al. 2002, in France), a”
Did globalization restrict partisan politics? An empirical evaluation of social expenditures in a panel of OECD countries (2009, background): “Schaltegger and Kuttel 2002; Sole-Olle 2003 )t hat use interactions of spatial lags and political variables.”
Evidence of Political Yardstick Competition in France Using a Two-Regime Spatial Durbin Model with Fixed Effects (2009, unknown): “No previous research, including Case (1993), Schaltegger and Küttel (2002), and Sollé-Ollé (2003), verifies the existence of this problem in actuality.”
Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus (2016, background): “The larger the margin, the greater the government’s capacity to increase expenditures and taxes (Dubois et al. 2007; Solé-Ollé 2003, 2006).”
Tax Mimicking and Yardstick Competition Among Local Governments in the Netherlands (2005, background): “Solé Ollé (2003) finds this is the case in Spanish municipalities.”
Fiscal Interactions Among European Countries: Does the EU Matter? (2007, unknown): “Tax reaction functions are estimated following a literature initiated by Case, Hines and Rosen (1993) and followed by several other researchers (e.g. Brueckner and Saavedra, (2001), Solè-Ollè (2003), Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano or functioning of the internal market is at stake.”
Spatial Panel-data Models Using Stata (2017, background): “…observed for economic and socio-demographic variables such as unemployment, crime rates, house prices, per-capita health expenditures and the alike (Soll´e Oll´e 2003; Moscone and Knapp 2005; Revelli 2005; Soll´e Oll´e 2005; Kostov 2009; Elhorst and Freret 2009; Elhorst et al. 2010; Moscone et al.…”
WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT CORPORATE TAX COMPETITION? (2013, background): “…(2001, 2003)), Belgian municipalities (Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998)), and municipalities in British Columbia (Brett and Pinkse (2000)), Boston (Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), Milan (Bordignon, et al. (2003)), Barcelona (Solé-Ollé (2003)) and dutch municipalities (Allers and Elhorst (2005).”