Accounting Discretion, Horizon Problem, and CEO Retirement Benefits

By Paul Kalyta. 2009

155 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cb041e0ed13fc02516bfac472842d0bee7ec0ef9

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Jeong‐Bon Kim
2. Donghua Chen
3. Shangkun Liang
4. Liandong Zhang
5. Ahsan Habib
6. Mostafa Monzur Hasan
7. Haiyan Jiang
8. Iftekhar Hasan

In Strategy and Management

1. Jeong‐Bon Kim
2. Donghua Chen
3. Shangkun Liang

Citations in the corpus

• CEO Tenure and Earnings Management (2015, unknown): “…also predict that CEOs overstate earnings in their final year of service in order to boost their final year's pay; although, extant empirical evidence related to this prediction is mixed (see e.g., Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Pourciau, 1993; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; Cheng, 2004; Kalyta, 2009).”
• China's Closed Pyramidal Managerial Labor Market and the Stock Price Crash Risk (2018, background): “This is a horizon problem argument consistent Kalyta (2009) that managers manage earnings upwards during final pre-retirement years when pension depends on firm performance.”