Competition and Strategic Information Acquisition in Credit Markets
By Robert Hauswald, Robert Marquez. 2006
143 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ca9945719809bec3b554ada403ea3466601d93d4
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Citations in the corpus
- Being a Foreigner Among Domestic Banks: Asset or Liability? (2009, unknown): “However, the severity of the asymmetric problem itself may be a function of distance (Hauswald and Marquez 2006).”
- Bank Competition and Stability: Cross-country Heterogeneity (2013, unknown): “This charter value view of banking, as theoretically modeled by Marcus (1984) and Keeley (1990), sees banks as choosing the risk of their asset portfolio.”
- Do Banks Benefit from Internationalization? Revisiting the Market Power-Risk Nexus (2013, unknown): “Another reason for a negative relationship between market power and risk is that increasing competitive pressure, for instance due to foreign contestants, may reduce the customer pool of the average bank, and thus its ability to generate private information (Hauswald and Marquez, 2006).”
- Organizational distance and use of collateral for business loans (2009, unknown): “Dell’Ariccia and Márquez (2004) and Hauswald and Marquez (2006) explicitly model banking competition and interest rate determination, assuming that banks’ information on borrowers decreases with distance.”
- Relationship and Transaction Lending in a Crisis (2013, unknown): “We consider in turn, 100% T bank lending, 100% R bank lending, and nally a combination of R and T bank lending.”
- Banking and Trading (2012, unknown): “pacting the depth of relationships (Boot and Thakor, 2000; Hauswald and Marquez, 2006) or”
- Do banks price discriminate spatially? Evidence from small business lending in local credit markets (2013, unknown): “Since the authors consider the actual distance between applicant and bank branch, and control for distance to the nearest rival of the bank, their findings are supportive of information-based models of discriminatory pricing (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 2004; Hauswald and Marquez 2006).”
- Financial Expertise as an Arms Race (2012, unknown): “The banks in Hauswald and Marquez (2006) acquire information about the creditworthiness of borrowers because it softens price competition between banks that compete 1728 The Journal of Finance R© for market shares, whereas investors in Fishman and Parker (2010) acquire information about the value…”
- CHAPTER 14 – Competition and Regulation in Banking (2008, methodology): “To illustrate the agency problem between banks and depositors, we use a simple model adapted from Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Cerasi and Daltung (2000) and Carletti (2004).”
- Accounting Information in Financial Contracting: The Incomplete Contract Theory Perspective (2016, unknown): “…control they may act in their own self-interest and maximize the value of their claims rather than firm value (e.g., Sharpe, 1990, Rajan, 1992, and Hauswald and Marquez, 2003, 2006), the agency perspective mainly focuses on opportunism on the borrowers’ part (e.g., asset substitution and…”