Proof systems for general statements about discrete logarithms

By Jan Camenisch, Markus Stadler. 1997

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Citations in the corpus

Riffle (2016, methodology): “We can use zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge [15] for 1, and Chaum-Pedersen proof [17] for 2.”
Proactively Accountable Anonymous Messaging in Verdict (2012, methodology): “We adopt the technique of Golle and Juels [25] and use a non-interactive proof-of-knowledge of discrete logarithms [11] to prove that the ciphertext has the correct form.”
Riposte: An Anonymous Messaging System Handling Millions of Users (2015, methodology): “1 This proof uses standard witness hiding techniques for discretelogarithm-based zero knowledge proofs [12], [22].”
Privacy-Friendly Aggregation for the Smart-Grid (2011, methodology): “When referring to the proofs above, we follow the notation introduced by Camenisch and Stadler [18].”
Constant-Size Commitments to Polynomials and Their Applications (2010, methodology): “Alice may prove knowledge of a nonzero committed value φ(i) without revealing it, and compose this proof with other proofs about mi using standard ZK proof techniques for proving knowledge of, relations between or the length of discrete logarithms [11].”
UnLynx: A Decentralized System for Privacy-Conscious Data Sharing (2017, background): “includes an implementation of a verifiable shuffle of sequences of ElGamal pairs [34] and zero-knowledge proofs for general statements about discrete logarithms [16].”
A protocol for property-based attestation (2006, methodology): “To describe the semantics of these proofs we apply the notation suggested by Camenisch and Stadler [8].”
Privacy-preserving smart metering (2011, methodology): “U’s privacy relies on the hiding property of commitments and on the zero-knowledge property of proofs [7].”
Floating Car Data from Smartphones : What Google and Waze Know About You and How Hackers Can Control Traffic (2013, methodology): “This paper follows the notation of Camenisch and Stadler [5] to describe zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge.”
Constant-Round Multi-party Private Set Union Using Reversed Laurent Series (2012, methodology): “Given the above, a zero-knowledge protocol for ZKPK[Com(f(x)),Com(g(x))] can be constructed using standard techniques, following [5].”
An Accumulator Based on Bilinear Maps and Efficient Revocation for Anonymous Credentials (2009, methodology): “When referring to the above proofs, we will follow the notation introduced by Camenisch and Stadler [32] for various proofs of knowledge of discrete logarithms and proofs of the validity of statements about discrete logarithms.”
Privacy-Preserving Set Operations (2005, background): “Note that Paillier’s cryptosystem [23] satisfies each of our requirements: it is additively homomorphic, supports ciphertexts re-randomization and threshold decryption (secure in the malicious case) [10,11], and allows certain efficient zero-knowledge proofs (standard constructions from [5,3], and p”
A Protocol for Privately Reporting Ad Impressions at Scale (2016, methodology): “This proof uses ideas from the Groth-Kohlweiss [25] proof of membership as well as the classical Camenisch-Stadler [15] proofs of linear relations between logarithms.”
Proving in Zero-Knowledge that a Number Is the Product of Two Safe Primes (1998, methodology): “Previously known protocols allow only to prove that algebraic relations modulo a publicly known integer hold [4,9,16,18].”