Theories of corporate governance : the philosophical foundations of corporate governance
By T. Clarke. 2004
392 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c876dc7bfda5eb9714ba12dbe87c034a9a14261e
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Citations in the corpus
- Corporate governance and firms financial performance in the United Kingdom (2020, background): “Clarke (2004) points that allowing managers to take decisions on their own without having to go through bureaucratic processes improve job satisfaction that contributes towards the overall financial performance of the firm.”
- Insight of Corporate Governance Theories (2012, background): “Therefore according to the view of the agency theorists, an efficient market is considered a solution to mitigate the agency problem, which includes an efficient market for corporate control, management labour and corporate information (Clarke, 2004).”
- Good corporate governance in Nigeria: Antecedents, propositions and peculiarities (2015, background): “Thus it is important that models for good corporate governance are not populated in isolation of the rest of the institutional underpinnings (Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011a; Guillen, 2000).”
- Compliance and multidimensional firm performance: Evaluating the efficacy of rule-based code of corporate governance (2013, unknown): “The two other theories that have been used separately or with agency theories are; information asymmetry andmanagerial signaling theory (Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007; Rhee and Lee, 2008) and convergence theory (Clarke, 2004a,b).”