Staged Financing in Venture Capital: Moral Hazard and Risks

By Susheng Wang, Hai Zhou. 2003

220 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Management of Technology and Innovation

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c71412192db2d5ee4600f6cc8b309748f2de499e

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Luca Grilli
2. Samuele Murtinu
3. Douglas J. Cumming
4. F. Bertoni
5. Massimo G. Colombo
6. A. Quas
7. Tereza Tykvová
8. Tom Vanacker

In Management of Technology and Innovation

1. Samuele Murtinu
2. Luca Grilli
3. Douglas J. Cumming
4. Massimo G. Colombo
5. Sofia Johan

Citations in the corpus

• The Causes and Consequences of Venture Capital Stage Financing (2011, unknown): “Finally, staging could incur underinvestment problems, as suggested by Wang and Zhou (2004). Therefore, the VC investor will balance the costs of monitoring the entrepreneur and the costs of staging specified”
• Duration Analysis of Venture Capital Staging: A Real Options Perspective (2008, unknown): “Venture capital firms can stage their financing to mitigate information asymmetry and agency problems (e.g. Neher, 1999; Wang and Zhou, 2004 ).”
• Governmental and independent venture capital investments in Europe: a firm-level performance analysis (2017, background): “, 2010) and monitoring activities (Gompers, 1995; Lerner, 1995; Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2003, 2004; Wang and Zhou, 2004; Giot and Schwienbacher, 2007; Hege et al., 2009; Cressy et al., 2007; Dihiya and Ray, 2012).”
• Patents, Trademarks, and Their Complementarity in Venture Capital Funding (2016, unknown): “Such staged financing allows VCs to reduce information asymmetries and agency problems (Sahlman, 1990; Wang and Zhou, 2004).”