What Does Tax Aggressiveness Signal? Evidence from Stock Price Reactions to News about Tax Shelter Involvement

By Michelle Hanlon, Joel B. Slemrod. 2009

1,061 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c6e2d9b02b63d4ce55afe35e9a033c8eae3db0b5

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Citations in the corpus

Outside Directors, Corporate Social Responsibility Performance, and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness: An Empirical Analysis (2016, background): “Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) find that directors of some large multinational firms mention in their annual report that they ‘‘owe it to their shareholders’’ to reduce corporate taxes by any legitimate and legal means possible.”
Customer-Supplier Relationships and Corporate Tax Avoidance (2017, background): “For example, prior research argues that the public revelation of tax avoidance can damage a firm’s reputation among consumers (e.g., Austin and Wilson, 2013; Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009).”
Corporate social responsibility and tax avoidance: A comment and reflection (2013, background): “This literature even suggests that tax avoiding firms can be penalized in equity markets relative to other rms that presumably avoid less tax (Hanlon & Slemrod, 2009), although they interestingly find evidence of cross-sectional ariation.”
A review of tax research (2010, neutral): “92 Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) report statements from the press in this regard.”
Board of Director Gender and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness: An Empirical Analysis (2017, background): “Prior research finds that corporate governance and board characteristics significantly influences tax aggressiveness (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Hanlon and Slemrod 2009; Chen et al. 2010; Brown 2011; Lanis and Richardson 2011; Brown and Drake 2014).”
The Role of Managerial Ability in Corporate Tax Avoidance (2017, neutral): “We omit SG&A because advertising expense is a component of SG&A and advertising expense better captures the nontax costs of tax avoidance (Hanlon and Slemrod 2009).”
Incentives for Tax Planning and Avoidance: Evidence from the Field (2014, background): “For example, empirical-archival studies such as Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) and Gallemore et al. (2013) only examine firms whose tax strategies were discovered.”
The taxman cometh: Does tax uncertainty affect corporate cash holdings? (2017, neutral): “For example, Hanlon and Slemrod (2009), Graham et al. (2014), and Gallemore et al. (2014) examine whether firms are concerned about reputational effects of tax avoidance and whether firms bear reputational costs (measured in a variety of ways) upon revelation of tax aggressive activities.”