Equilibrium Earnings Management, Incentive Contracts, and Accounting Standards
By Pierre Jinghong Liang. 2004
111 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c570dc320e6829bd20f71a7d543495028c22ff15
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
- Chi-Wen Jevons Lee
- Heng Yue
- Ralf Ewert
- Laura Yue Li
- Alfred Wagenhofer
- Riccardo Cimini
- Mary E. Barth
- Thomas Jeanjean
Citations in the corpus
- Understanding Earnings Quality: A Review of the Proxies, Their Determinants and Their Consequences (2010, unknown): “68 See Ng and Stoeckenius (1979), Lambert (1984), Verrecchia (1986), Dye (1988) and Liang (2004).”
- Performance, Growth and Earnings Management (2006, background): “Representative work includes Arya, Glover, and Sunder (1998), Demski (1998), Demski, Frimor, and Sappington (2004), Dye (1988), Evans and Sridhar (1996), and Liang (2004) .”
- Economic Effects of Tightening Accounting Standards to Restrict Earnings Management (2005, background): “However, Sankar and Subramanyam (2001) do not explicitly study standard-setting issues.”
- Implications of Power: When the CEO Can Pressure the CFO to Bias Reports (2014, unknown): “Second, there is only a single period, which eliminates the ability to directly address multi-period aspects of accounting quality, such as forward-looking information, earnings smoothness, accrual reversals, or reserves (e.g., Demski, 1998; Dutta and Fan, 2012; Liang, 2004).”