Controlling high bandwidth aggregates in the network

By Ratul Mahajan, Steven M. Bellovin, Sally Floyd, John Ioannidis, Vern Paxson, Scott Shenker. CCRV, 2002

896 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c4dfd2b82c94ed93049b790468f85337a03455cd

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In Computer Networks and Communications

Citations in the corpus

Defense Against Spoofed IP Traffic Using Hop-Count Filtering (2007, background): “The router-based approach installs defense mechanisms inside IP routers to tra ce he source(s) of attack [4], [30], [43], [45], [46], [49], or det ect and block attacking traffic [15], [23], [25], [29], [31], [36], [ 50], [56].”
Finding Hierarchical Heavy Hitters in Data Streams (2003, background): “Indeed, automated aggregate-based congestion control mechanisms (e.g., based on pre(cid:12)x subnets) have been proposed for regulating Internet tra(cid:14)c to protect against such DoS attacks [21].”
Bohatei: Flexible and Elastic DDoS Defense (2015, background): “, [39]), packet marking and unforgeable identifiers (e.”
Botz-4-sale: surviving organized DDoS attacks that mimic flash crowds (2005, background): “Furthermore, in contrast to ba ndwidth attacks [48, 36], it is difficult to detect big resource consu mers when the attack targets higher-layer bottlenecks such as CPU, da tabase, and disk because commodity operating systems do not support fine -grained resource monitoring [13, 12, 57].”
Hop-count filtering: an effective defense against spoofed DDoS traffic (2003, background): “On-line filtering mechanisms rely on IP router enh ancements [15, 23, 24, 25, 26, 31] to detect abnormal traffic patte rns and foil DDoS attacks.”
A DoS-limiting network architecture (2005, background): “, pushback [16, 10] an d more recently AITF [3].”
Measuring ISP topologies with Rocketfuel (2004, background): “Topology influences the dynamics of routing protocols [3], [11], the scalability of multicast [19], the efficacy of denial-of-service tracing and response [12], [18], [23], [24], and other aspects of protocol performance [20].”
Statistical approaches to DDoS attack detection and response (2003, methodology): “We have imposed some significant constraints on our DDoS defense development: no explicit coordination (e.g., pushback [ 7 ]) between defending network components, no built-in knowledge of applications or protocols, and no instrumentation at end hosts.”
Measuring ISP topologies with rocketfuel (2002, background): “Topology influences the dynamics of routing protocols [2, 10], the scalability of multicast [17], the efficacy of proposals for denial-of-service tracing and response [16, 11 , 21, 22], and other aspects of protocol performance [18].”
Defending against distributed denial-of-service attacks with max-min fair server-centric router throttles (2005, methodology): “Hence, our routers have simplified responsibilities, when compared with [13] – they do not need to compute server-centric max-min fair allocations, and are not required to generate and send back status messages about current resource state to the server.”
Bitmap algorithms for counting active flows on high speed links (2003, background): “propose a mechanism that allows backbone routers to limit the effect of (distributed) DoS attacks [13].”
Global Intrusion Detection in the DOMINO Overlay System (2004, methodology): “We also evaluate how to configure DOMINO in order to maximize performance gains from the perspectives of blacklist length, blacklist freshness and IP proximity.”
Implementing Pushback: Router-Based Defense Against DDoS Attacks (2002, methodology): “So far we have described thelocalversion of ACC.”
New directions in traffic measurement and accounting (2001, background): “[15] proposes a mechanism that reacts to them as soon as they are detected.”
Preventing Internet denial-of-service with capabilities (2004, background): “Our work generalizes and builds on several of these efforts, particularly the pushback [10] and secure overlay proposals [8] [1].”