Nash and Walras equilibrium via Brouwer

By John D. Geanakoplos. 2003

85 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c490e2221a9bbfcfca0c78ac54e41304231f08ee

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Kousha Etessami
2. Mihalis Yannakakis
3. Christos H. Papadimitriou
4. Paul W. Goldberg
5. Constantinos Daskalakis
6. Tuomas Sandholm
7. Xiaotie Deng
8. Xi Chen

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Kousha Etessami
2. Mihalis Yannakakis
3. Constantinos Daskalakis
4. Paul W. Goldberg
5. Christos H. Papadimitriou
6. Tuomas Sandholm
7. Xiaotie Deng
8. Xi Chen

Citations in the corpus

• On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria and Other Fixed Points (Extended Abstract) (2010, background): “Nash proved his theorem in [33] using Brouwer’s theorem: he showed that for every finite game, Γ, the Brouwer fixed points of the following function, F Γ , are the NEs of Γ: F Γ ( x ) ( i,j ) .”
• The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium (2006, background): “In Nash’s reduction, as well as in subsequent ones [ 10 ], the constructed Brouwer function is quite specialized, and this has led to speculation on whether the flxed points of such functions (and thus Nash equilibria) are easier to flnd than for general Brouwer functions.”