On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria and Other Fixed Points (Extended Abstract)

By Kousha Etessami, Mihalis Yannakakis. IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2010

296 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4fb2e48600a1844ffdb74911d680e564486a7b6b

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Tuomas Sandholm
2. Christos H. Papadimitriou
3. Paul W. Goldberg
4. Constantinos Daskalakis
5. Xiaotie Deng
6. Xi Chen
7. Noam Brown
8. Karl Tuyls

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Tuomas Sandholm
2. Constantinos Daskalakis
3. Paul W. Goldberg
4. Christos H. Papadimitriou
5. Xiaotie Deng
6. Xi Chen
7. Tim Roughgarden
8. É. Tardos

Citations in the corpus

• The State of Solving Large Incomplete-Information Games, and Application to Poker (2010, background): “With three or more players, the problem becomes FIXPcomplete even in the zero-sum case (Etessami and Yannakakis 2007).”
• The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium (2009, unknown): “Etessami and Yannakakis 9 develop a very interesting complexity theory of the problem of computing the exact equilibrium (or other fixed points), a problem that is important in applications outside Game Theory, such as Program Verification.”
• The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium (2006, background): “[14] D. S. Johnson, C. H. Papadimitriou and M. Yannakakis, How Easy is Local Search?, J. Comput.”