ROTE: Rollback Protection for Trusted Execution

By Sinisa Matetic, Mansoor Ahmed, Kari Kostiainen, Aritra Dhar, David Marco Sommer, Arthur Gervais, Ari Juels, Srdjan Čapkun. 2017

263 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Citations in the corpus

Ekiden: A Platform for Confidentiality-Preserving, Trustworthy, and Performant Smart Contracts (2018, critical): “The monotonic counters in SGX are untrustworthy, however [59].”
IRON: Functional Encryption using Intel SGX (2017, background): “Enforcing limits on the number of times a client can run a function would require maintaining non-volatile enclave state, for which SGX does not immediately provide rollback protection (see [42] for a recent system providing rollback protection using SGX’s monotonic counters [33].”
Giving State to the Stateless: Augmenting Trustworthy Computation with Ledgers (2019, methodology): “A second proposal, ROTE [44], uses a consensus between a cluster of distributed enclaves to in order to address the rollback problem.”
Occlumency: Privacy-preserving Remote Deep-learning Inference Using SGX (2019, background): “We do not consider the SGX side-channel attacks [33, 81] and rollback attacks, which can be prevented [55, 57], as well as Denial of Services (DoS).”
This Paper Is Included in the Proceedings of the 12th Usenix Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (osdi '16). Ryoan: a Distributed Sandbox for Untrusted Computation on Secret Data Ryoan: a Distributed Sandbox for Untrusted Computation on Secret Data (unknown): “This drawback forces enclave designers to rely on hardware counters [82], which have limitations and performance issues, or software-based strategies that leverage other machines [63].”
DeepAttest: An End-to-End Attestation Framework for Deep Neural Networks (2019, unknown): “proposed [30, 33].”
Chiron: Privacy-preserving Machine Learning as a Service (2018, background): “This drawback forces enclave designers to rely on hardware counters [60], which have limitations and performance issues, or software-based strategies that leverage other machines [49].”
Towards Scaling Blockchain Systems via Sharding (2018, background): “ f + 1 commit messages before executing the request. AHL periodically seals the logs and writes them to persistent storage. This mechanism, however, does not offer protection against rollback attacks [34]. We describe how to extend AHL to guard against these attacks in Appendix A. Optimizing communi”
EnclaveDB: A Secure Database Using SGX (2018, methodology): “In EnclaveDB, we use a dedicated monotonic counter service implemented using replicated enclaves [29].”
Tesseract: Real-Time Cryptocurrency Exchange using Trusted Hardware (2017, background): “We note that the Tesseract enclave is assumed to be running without interruptions, since our enclave code disallows rollbacks [75, 48] by design (cf.”
SgxPectre: Stealing Intel Secrets from SGX Enclaves Via Speculative Execution (2018, background): “…encouraged researchers and practitioners to develop various new applications to utilize these features ( e.g. , [2, 22, 51, 54, 59, 68, 69, 85, 88]), and new software tools or frameworks ( e.g. , [4, 5, 9, 24, 43, 50, 61, 65, 67, 72, 80]) to help developers adopt this emerging programming paradigm.”
MLCapsule: Guarded Offline Deployment of Machine Learning as a Service (2018, methodology): “Fortunately, there exist hardware solutions relying on counters [33] and distributed software-based strategies [19] to prevent rollback attacks.”