Studies in the Logic of Explanation

By C. Hempel, P. Oppenheim. 1948

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Citations in the corpus

Explanation in Human-AI Systems: A Literature Meta-Review, Synopsis of Key Ideas and Publications, and Bibliography for Explainable AI (2019, background): “…Montague, 1961; Feigl and Maxwell, 1962; Ginet, 2008; Giordano and Schwind, 2004; Eberle, Kaplan, and Montague, 1961; Hankinson, 2001; Harman, 1965; Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948; Hospers, 1946; Hume, 1748; James, 2003, 2003; Kaplan, 1964; Kim, Khanna and Koyejo, 2016; Kment, 2014; Langley, 1987;…”
Explainable AI: Beware of Inmates Running the Asylum Or: How I Learnt to Stop Worrying and Love the Social and Behavioural Sciences (2017, methodology): “Speciﬁcally, two well-known theories of explanation, sometimes cited and used in ex-plainable AI articles, are the logically deductive model of explanation [Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948], and the co-variation model [Kelley, 1967]; both of which have had signiﬁcant impact.”
Explanation in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Social Sciences (2017, neutral): “Earlier accounts of explanation from Hempel and Oppenheim [68] argued for logically deductive models of explanation.”
Students’ intuitive explanations of the causes of homologies and adaptations (2008, background): “In the philosophy of science there have been several views on what a scientific explanation consists in. It has been suggested that to explain something is: (a) to show how it is derived in a logical argument that includes a law in the premises (covering law model: Hempel and Oppenheim 1948 ), (b) ”
Hempel and Oppenheim on Explanation (1961, background): “A sentence S is called a derivative theory if (1) S consists of one or more quantifiers followed by an expression without quantifiers, (2) S is not logically equivalent to any singular sentence, (3) at least one individual constant occurs in S, and (4) there is a class K of fundamental theories such”
Defining Explanation in Probabilistic Systems (1997, background): “Traditionally, it has been modeled by introducing a deductive relation between the explanation and the fact to be explained (explanandum) (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948).”
The Logic of Explanatory Power (2011, background): “Necessity (Glymour 1980), statistical relevance (Salmon 1971), inference and reason (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948; Hempel 1965), familiarity (Friedman 1974), unification (Friedman 1974; Kitcher 1989), causation (Salmon 1984; Woodward 2003), and mechanism (Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000) are only…”
Three decades of lay epistemics: The why, how, and who of knowledge formation (2009, methodology): “According to this model, a scientific explanation contains two major elements: an explanandum, a sentence ‘‘describing the phenomenon to be explained’’ and an explanans, ‘‘the class of sentences that account for the phenomenon’’ (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948, reprinted in Hempel, 1965, p. 247).”
Approximation and Idealization: Why the Difference Matters* (2012, background): “In the venerable deductive-nomological (DN) or “covering law” account of explanation of Hempel and Oppenheim (1948), one explains some phenomenon by deducing it from physical laws with the assistance of particular conditions.”
The explanatory effect of a label: Explanations with named categories are more satisfying. (2017, methodology): “Beginning with philosophy, for over 65 years (since Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948) the question of what explanation amounts to has been one of the most central in the philosophy of science.”
Functional explanation and the function of explanation. (2006, background): “Several theories suggest that an explanation must demonstrate why what you are explaining was to be expected, or how it can be subsumed under a law-like pattern (e.g. Salmon, 1989; Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948; see Strevens, in preparation for nice discussion of different explanatory relations).”
Scientific Literacy: The Role of Goal-Directed Reading and Evaluation in Understanding Scientific Information (2014, methodology): “After Hempel and Oppenheim (1948), we use the terms explanans and explanandum to refer to the chain of linked factors and the to-be-explained outcome, respectively.”
A companion to the history of economic thought (2003, background): “N) model, in which a particular observed event was accounted for by being subsumed under a general law together with a set of initial conditions (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948).”
Goals Affect the Perceived Quality of Explanations (2015, background): “…pragmatic and contextual considerations to the side, focusing instead on a specification of formal relationships or features that are constitutive of explanations, such as deductive arguments of a particular form (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948) or causal processes that generate an effect (Salmon, 1984).”