Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes
By C. Ferraz, Frederico Finan. 2006
1,581 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5745693fd50244c0ac0b4a64b75518d3906342e7
How researchers see this paper
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In Management Science and Operations Research
- Rohini Pande
- David Strömberg
- Stuti Khemani
- T. Nannicini
- T. Fujiwara
- Simeon Djankov
- Benjamin A. Olken
- Marko Klašnja
In Sociology and Political Science
- Rohini Pande
- Michael Callen
- James Long
- Lucie Gadenne
- Marko Klašnja
- Benjamin A. Olken
- Stuti Khemani
- T. Nannicini
Citations in the corpus
- Corruption in Developing Countries (2012, neutral): “The second channel may be particularly important when the outcomes being measured relate to service delivery not corruption.9 Ferraz and Finan (2008) examine the role of electoral sanctions.”
- Social Capital and Political Accountability (2010, background): “For Brazil, Ferraz and Finan (2008) exploit (random) audit reports on municipal governments and show that corruption disclosure is punished by voters in terms of decreased reelection probability. They also show that this punishment is more pronounced in municipalities with radio stations. A contribu”
- Buying votes vs. supplying public services : political incentives to under-invest in pro-poor policies (2013, background): “This argument has not been formally made in the clientelism or vote buying literature, but is linked to other work on how outside options and benefits from holding office influences the pool of candidates and the effort exerted upon winning office (Caselli and Morelli, 2004; Messner and Polborn, 200”
- The Simple Economics of Extortion: Evidence from Trucking in Aceh (2009, background): “…in Aceh province fell by more than 25 percent starting about 2 weeks after the press conference took place, suggesting that publicizing corruption may play an important role in reducing it (Ferraz and Finan 2008).10 Despite the publicity, surveyors were able to continue collecting data unobserved.”
- The economy, corruption, and the vote: Evidence from experiments in Sweden and Moldova (2013, background): “, 2004; Della Porta, 2000; McCann and Dominguez, 1998), or when it is reinforced by revelation of hard information (Banerjee et al., 2012; Chong et al., 2011; Ferraz and Finan, 2008).”
- Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness, and Infant Health: Evidence From Brazil (2015, background): “The index is constructed from answers of a survey of federal legislators elected in 1998, and ranks parties from zero to ten, with larger numbers being associated with right-wing ideologies.”
- Local Electoral Incentives and Decentralized Program Performance (2012, background): “Clearly, reelection responds to the quality of performance in a broader set of public functions, which are presumably correlated with effective management of the Bolsa Escola program (Ferraz & Finan, 2008).”
- Internet and Politics: Evidence from U.K. Local Elections and Local Government Policies (2015, background): “First, a growing body of papers study the role of media in politics: Strömberg (2004b), Gentzkow (2006), Larcinese (2007), DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007), Ferraz and Finan (2008), Prat and Strömberg (2005), Snyder and Strömberg (2010), Enikolopov, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya (2011), Gentzkow, Shapiro, an”