The quest for security in mobile ad hoc networks
By Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Levente Buttyán, Srdjan Čapkun. ACM Interational Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing, 2001
988 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c24fe67e2bb79efc1f8239d286a0eba402cc9b9b
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Jean-Pierre Hubaux
- Adrian Perrig
- Yih-Chun Hu
- David B. Johnson
- Srdjan Čapkun
- Peng Ning
- J. V. D. Merwe
- Stephen McDonald
In Computer Networks and Communications
- Jean-Pierre Hubaux
- Adrian Perrig
- Srdjan Čapkun
- Peng Ning
- Jie Wu
- Levente Buttyán
- Yih-Chun Hu
- David B. Johnson
Citations in the corpus
- Secure link state routing for mobile ad hoc networks (2003, methodology): “1 Key certification can be provided by a coalition of K nodes and the use of threshold cryptography [15,13], the use of local repositories of certificates provided by the network nodes [14], or a distributed instantiation of a CA [15].”
- Rushing attacks and defense in wireless ad hoc network routing protocols (2003, methodology): “We assume that the keys necessary for broadcast authentication are distributed in advance; a number of techniques for distributing such information have been proposed [2, 16, 17, 24, 42, 46].”
- PIKE: peer intermediaries for key establishment in sensor networks (2005, background): “Hubaux, Buttyán, and Čapkun also present a system for ad hoc peerto-peer authentication based on public key certificates [15].”
- Observation-based Cooperation Enforcement in Ad Hoc Networks (2003, methodology): “Hubaux et al. [16] employ a self-organized PGP-based scheme to au-thenticate nodes using chains of certificates and transitivity of trust.”
- MOCA : MObile Certificate Authority for Wireless Ad Hoc Networks (2004, methodology): “In our current work, we are considering techniques to provide more efficient support for revocation.”
- On Data-Centric Trust Establishment in Ephemeral Ad Hoc Networks (2008, background): “To the best of our knowledge, the computation of trust values in the context of ad hoc networks has been considered in only two cases: certiflcation [7, 11 , 26] and routing [2, 28].”
- Securing ad hoc routing protocols (2004, methodology): “The authors of [8] suggest a scheme which uses a web of trust, similar to the encryption tool PGP.”
- Wireless mesh networks: a survey (2005, background): “A self-organization scheme was proposed in [63] to distribute and manage the security keys.”
- Packet leashes: a defense against wormhole attacks in wireless networks (2003, background): “a public key infrastructure; Hubaux, Buttyán, and Čapkun bootstrap trust relationships from PGP-like certificates without relying on a trusted public key infrastructure [17]; Kong”
- SEAD: secure efficient distance vector routing for mobile wireless ad hoc networks (2002, background): “As mentioned in Section 3, some researchers have explored the establishment of trust relationships and authenticated keys in ad hoc networks [16, 17, 36, 42].”
- Wormhole attacks in wireless networks (2006, background): “Zhou and Haas [42] propose such a public-key infrastructure; Hubaux et al. bootstrap trust relationships from PGP-like certificates without relying on a trusted public-key infrastructure [15]; Kong et al. [22] propose asymmetric mechanisms for threshold signatures for certificates.”
- SPINS: Security Protocols for Sensor Networks (2001, background): “present a system for ad hoc peer-to-peer authentication based on public key certificates [24].”
- Self-Organized Public-Key Management for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (2003, background): “Several results related to security have already been published, for key management [13], [14] and for cooperation among the nodes [15].”
- Secure routing in wireless sensor networks: attacks and countermeasures (2003, background): “In the following sections we outline our assumptions about the underlying network, propose models for different classes of adversaries, and consider security goals in this setting.”