Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies

By George S. Mellman. 2002

204 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Business and International Management, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c1e39b1dfc92c2fac5203a86a13b62cc5743249f

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Business and International Management

In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

In Sociology and Political Science

Citations in the corpus

The impact of board size on firm performance: evidence from the UK (2009, background): “The proportion of outside directors does not have a positive impact on general firm performance (Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998), or on specific monitoring tasks, such as CEO turnover (Cosh and Hughes, 1997; and Franks et al., 2001).”
Determinants of voluntary disclosures in Kenyan companies annual reports (2007, background): “They are viewed as providing the necessary checks and balances needed to enhance board effectiveness (Franks et al., 2001).”
The Institutions of Corporate Governance (2005, background): “Franks, Mayer & Renneboog (2001); Hermalin & Weisbach (1998); Bhagat & Black (1999).”
CEO Compensation and Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation of UK Panel Data (2007, unknown): “However, this finding is contrary to the previous empirical evidence reported by Cosh and Hughes (1997) and Franks et al. (2001) that the institutional shareholders in the UK companies are passive.”
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF BANKS: A SURVEY (2016, unknown): “For example, Franks et al. (2001) report that for non-financial firms the disciplinary role of UK boards increases when the roles of the CEO and the chairman are split and when the chairman is a non-executive director.”
A century of corporate takeovers: What have we learned and where do we stand? (2008, background): “5.2 Explaining the rise and decline in hostile takeover activity Until recently, the market for corporate control took place for the bigger part in the US (Morck et al., 1988; Bhide, 1990; Martin and McConnell, 1991) and in the UK (Franks et al., 2001).”
Corporate Governance Convergence : Evidence from Takeover Regulation Reforms in Europe (2005, background): “Major investors have strong incentives to monitor management and replace it in poorly performing companies (Franks, Mayer and Renneboog 2001).”
Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure in Kuwait (2010, background): “Franks et al (2001) suggest that non-executive directors provide the necessary checks and balances to enhance board effectiveness.”