Ownership structure, founder leadership, and performance in Norwegian SMEs: implications for financing entrepreneurial opportunities
By Trond Randøy, Sanjay Goel. 2003
343 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c1c1b26845d6eba0d1ce71c3bc62651d3539ef26
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Alfredo De Massis
- Mattias Nordqvist
- James J. Chrisman
- J. Kotlar
- Franz Willi Kellermanns
- Mike Wright
- Jess H. Chua
- Lucia Naldi
In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
- Alfredo De Massis
- Mattias Nordqvist
- James J. Chrisman
- J. Kotlar
- Franz Willi Kellermanns
- Jess H. Chua
- Mike Wright
- Thomas M. Zellweger
Citations in the corpus
- Entrepreneurial Risk Taking in Family Firms (2005, background): “Some agency theorists believe that family firms represent an ideal organizational form where the objectives of the owner and the firm are aligned (Randøy & Goel, 2003; Schulze et al., 2003).”
- Entrepreneurship and Family Firm Research: A Bibliometric Analysis of An Emerging Field* (2016, background): “A fourth group of very important studies places special interest in analyzing the influence of the role of the founder on various aspects related to strategy, funding opportunities, and business results (Miller, Le BretonMiller, and Lester 2011; Randoy and Goel 2003).”
- Ownership and Management Issues Associated With Family Firm Performance and Company Objectives (2006, background): “However, there is some debate about the usefulness of agency theory in a family firm context (Arthurs & Busenitz, 2003; Astrachan, 2003; Greenwood, 2003; Randoy & Goel, 2003; Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003; Sharma, 2004).”
- Entrepreneurial Orientation, Risk Taking, and Performance in Family Firms (2007, background): “This type of firm is often characterized by little use of formal control systems (Daily & Dollinger, 1992; Geeraerts, 1984; Randøy & Goel, 2003), few outside board members (Cowling, 2003; Schulze et al., 2001), and weak pressure from external monitors demanding accountability and transparency…”
- Generic strategies and firm performance in SMEs: a longitudinal study of Austrian SMEs (2010, background): “Moreover, since it is frequently argued that ownership has an impact on performance (Randøy and Goel 2003; Durand and Vargas 2003), we included ownership as a further control variable at firm level.”
- ‘Types’ of private family firms: an exploratory conceptual and empirical analysis (2007, background): “1997 ), and so they are organization-serving (Randoy and Goel 2003 ).”
- Board ownership, audit committees' effectiveness and corporate voluntary disclosures (2010, background): “The firm thus incurs high-agency cost for lack of transparency ( Randoy and Goel, 2003”