An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy*

By Hannes Leitgeb, Richard Pettigrew. Philosophia Scientiæ, 2010

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Probabilism, entropies and strictly proper scoring rules (2015, background): “12 Recent epistemic justifications of probabilism are accuracy-based argu13 ments [24, 25, 30, 31, 49], which all build on [11].”
An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy* (2010, background): “In Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010), we investigate the consequences of these norms.”
Strictly Proper Scoring Rules (2014, background): “Recently, quadratic inaccuracy measures, such as S Brier, have been advocated in [30, 31] on the grounds that they are the only class of measures which keep an agent out of certain epistemic dilemmas.”
What Does It Mean to be Biased: Motivated Reasoning and Rationality (2014, background): “Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010b) demonstrate that for a suitable measure of accuracy (justified in Leitgeb & Pettigrew, 2010a; but see Levinstein, 2012), Bayesianism follows from the simple premise that an agent ought to approximate the truth, and hence seek to minimize inaccuracy.”