Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries

By Quan Li, Adam L. Resnick. International Organization, 2003

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Subfields: Accounting, Information Systems, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c128a5349a84c49024221a4b83bbe7b2baac106e

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Citations in the corpus

Democracy, Autocracy, and Tax Incentives to Foreign Direct Investors: A Cross-National Analysis (2006, background): “As part of their analysis investigating the causes of FDI inflows to the developing countries, Li and Resnick (2003) provide one domestic explanation for cross-national variations in fiscal incentives.”
When BITs have some bite: The political-economic environment for bilateral investment treaties (2011, methodology): “ Li and Resnick (2003) argue that the greater political participation and representation inherent in democracies may constrain their ability to attract FDI because of less favorable conditions for foreign investors, such as higher taxes and labor-friendly policies (Henisz 2000).”
Exploring the relationship between institutional factors and FDI attractiveness: A meta-analytic review (2018, background): “…countries with market-based institutional factors, which constrain opportunistic behavior (Fan, Morck, Xu, & Yeung, 2009), encourage foreign competition, and allow MNEs to exploit ownership advantages abroad, are likely to decrease costs and attract FDI (Grosse & Trevino, 1996; Li & Resnick, 2003).”
Foreign direct investment, corruption and democracy (2013, background): “Resnick (2001) and Resnick and Li (2003) find that the level of democracy has a negative impact on foreign capital flows.”
Political risk spreads (2014, neutral): “Whereas Nigh (1985) finds a negative effect of political stability on FDI, more recent studies like Li and Resnick (2003) and Globerman and Shapiro (2003) find insignificant effects.”
Finding the “Democratic Advantage” in Sovereign Bond Ratings: The Importance of Strong Courts, Property Rights Protection, and the Rule of Law (2012, methodology): “…property rights for attracting capital, see Biglaiser and Staats 2010; Brunetti, Kisunko, and Weder 1997; Feng 2001; Globerman and Shapiro 2002; Jensen 2003 and 2006; Levine 1998; Li 2006 and 2009; Li and Resnick 2003; North 1990; Sherwood, Shepherd, and De Souza 1994; and Staats and Biglaiser…”
Labor Markets and the Demand for Foreign Direct Investment (2010, background): “…willingness to supply investment+6 More generally, existing accounts of the political economy of international economic inte- 4+ See Henisz 2002; Jensen 2003; and Li and Resnick 2003+An earlier generation of research, strongly influenced by dependency theory, argued that variation in FDI…”
Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct Investment (2011, methodology): “…in Table 2!, show that each treaty a government signs consistently produces some- 69+ For a similar approach, see Jakobsen and de Soysa 2006; and Li and Resnick 2003+ 70+ See Gujarati 2003, 15–18, for details on the calculation of substantive effects in log-linear models+ where between $21…”
Foreign Direct Investment and Bilateral Investment Treaties an International Political Perspective (2009, background): “Among the factors which in uence the decision of a MNE to invest in a foreign country, the security of its property rights is particularly valued, because it guarantees the MNE that it will earn its full return on investment (Li and Resnick, 2003).”
Institutions and inflows of foreign direct investment: a fuzzy-set analysis (2008, background): “Using a sample of less developed countries, Li and Resnick (2003) also noted that the political instability of a country may inhibit FDI inflows.”