Tunneling as an incentive for earnings management during the IPO process in China

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Does Religion Mitigate Tunneling? Evidence from Chinese Buddhism (2014, background): “…or by no winsorization. undisguised and traceable expropriation of minority shareholders through inter-corporate loans and need not undergo the same ‘‘fair value’’ tests as other forms of tunneling such as related party transactions and transfer pricing (Aharony et al. 2010; Jiang et al. 2010).”
Value relevance, earnings management and corporate governance in China (2015, background): “Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Emerging Markets Review j ou rna l homepage : www.e lsev ie r .com/ loca te /emr Australia and Canada (Barth and Clinch, 1996), six Asian economies (Graham andKing, 2000) and 14 European countries (Aharony et al., 2010a).”
Do State Enterprises Manage Earnings More than Privately Owned Firms? The Case of China (2011, background): “While several studies on Chinese SOEs suggest that state ownership is associated with earnings management in the form of tunneling (Aharony et al., 2010; Chen and Yuan, 2004; and Liu and Lu, 2003), there is also evidence that state-owned firms in China have lower levels of abnormal accruals (Ding et”
Controlling shareholders' tunneling and executive compensation: Evidence from China (2011, background): “When government is the controlling shareholder, related party transactions are relatively common because most of the listed companies are carved out from their state-owned groups (Aharony et al., 2010).”