Good Intentions, Bad Outcomes: Social Policy, Informality, and Economic Growth in Mexico

By S. Levy. 2008

548 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/be3a32fabe7f21976ebceebc437461d4f783a839

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In Sociology and Political Science

Citations in the corpus

A Helping Hand or the Long Arm of the Law? Experimental Evidence on What Governments Can Do to Formalize Firms (2013, unknown): “…of new firms, rather than from formalization of existing firms (e.g. Klapper et al, 2006; Bruhn 2011).1 Policymakers worry that this large stock of informal firms results in a loss in tax revenue, unfair competition for formal firms, and a culture of informality (Levy, 2008; Perry et al, 2007).”
(In)Formal and (Un)Productive: The Productivity Costs of Excessive Informality in Mexico (2012, methodology): “There has been an extensive debate on the nature of the informal sector and its implications for development (e.g., Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur and Ostrom, 2006; de Soto, 2000); Fields, 2007; Levy, 2008; Maloney, 2004; and Fajnzylber et al., 2007).”
Can Informal Firms Hurt Registered SMEs’ Access to Credit? (2016, unknown): “While the parasite view considers informal firms as unfair competitors to registered SMEs because they evade taxes and regulations (Farrell, 2004; Levy, 2008); the dual view sees both types of firms as fundamentally different (Rauch, 1991; La Porta and Shleifer, 2014).”
The Strugglers: The New Poor in Latin America? (2014, unknown): “27 Levy (2008) and Levy and Schady (2013) provide evidence that subsidies and social policies can encourage informality at lower levels of income because of their structure.”
Informality: Causes and Consequences for Development (2020, background): “The second view sees informal firms as ”parasite firms”, which are productive enough to survive in the formal sector, but choose to remain informal to earn higher profits from the cost advantages of not complying with taxes and regulations (e.g. Levy 2008).”
Social protection response to the COVID-19 crisis: options for developing countries (2020, background): “The destruction of existing jobs might thus have severe longer-term impacts on the size and productivity of developing countries’ formal sectors, which are a key policy focus (Levy, 2008).”
Firms, Informality, and Development: Theory and Evidence from Brazil (2018, background): “1, Schneider (2005) and La Porta and Shleifer (2008, 2014).”
The Missing “Missing Middle” (2014, background): “The fact that the average product of labor is higher in larger firms also supports the story by Harris and Todaro (1970), McKinsey (2005), and Levy (2008) that large firms pay above-market labor costs, except that there is no clear discontinuity in this relationship.”
How Can Safety Nets Contribute to Economic Growth? (2013, background): “Moreover, it consolidated various programs in diverse ministries – replacing them, rather than adding to them (Levy, 2006).”
Productivity and resource misallocation in Latin America1) (2012, background): “17 governments increasingly provide some benefits (health, pension) free of charge to workers conditional on their not being affiliated with social security (Levy, 2008).”
Enforcement of Labor Regulation and Informality (2011, methodology): “Our theoretical framework draws on Harris and Todaro (1970), Fields (1975, 2005), MacDonald and Solow (1985), Maloney (2004), and Levy (2008).4 Although labor regulation is strict in Brazil, there is surprisingly large wage and employment flexibility (e.g., Barros and Mendonca, 1996).”