The Calculus of Selfishness

By M. Milinski. 2011

547 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/be12970bee7fd5a7f2da0866e8f42122d010c87e

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In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

In Sociology and Political Science

Citations in the corpus

Evolutionary Establishment of Moral and Double Moral Standards through Spatial Interactions (2010, unknown): “It is known that punishment in the public goods game and similar games can promote cooperation above a certain critical threshold of the synergy factor r [11,25].”
Paths to the adoption of electric vehicles: An evolutionary game theoretical approach (2018, unknown): “As it is often the case in natural and human social dynamics (Bell 2010; Sigmund 2010; Traulsen et al. 2010), here we resort to strong selection (β=1), yet allowing for errors in decision-making, potentially induced by confounding factors common to Human decision-making, and that often translates…”
Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods game (2016, unknown): “PACS numbers: 89.75.”
The structure and dynamics of multilayer networks (2014, background): “In unstructured populations, in which players are well-mixed, evolutionary dynamics leads all the individuals to defection [338,339].”
Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games (2012, unknown): “[19] Sigmund K (2010) The Calculus of Selfishness.”
Sharp benefit-to-cost rules for the evolution of cooperation on regular graphs (2011, background): “For more b/c rules see [8, 16] and [20], to name but a few.”
Punish, but not too hard: how costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game (2010, unknown): “Accordingly, the social dilemma persists in the presence of punishing strategies, and for well-mixed interactions defectors still spread in the system [24].”
Self-organization of punishment in structured populations (2012, methodology): “By means of phase diagrams and the analysis of emerging spatial patterns, we demonstrate that adaptive punishment promotes public cooperation either through the invigoration of spatial reciprocity, the prevention of the emergence of cyclic dominance, or through the provision of competitive…”