Self-organization of punishment in structured populations

By Matjaz Perc, Attila Szolnoki. 2012

233 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Cooperation is crucial for the remarkable evolutionary success of the human species. Not surprisingly, some individuals are willing to bear additional costs in order to punish defectors. Current models assume that, once set, the fine and cost of punishment do not change over time. Here we show that relaxing this assumption by allowing players to adapt their sanctioning efforts in dependence on the success of cooperation can explain both the spontaneous emergence of punishment and its ability to deter defectors and those unwilling to punish them with globally negligible investments. By means of phase diagrams and the analysis of emerging spatial patterns, we demonstrate that adaptive punishment promotes public cooperation through the invigoration of spatial reciprocity, the prevention of the emergence of cyclic dominance, or the provision of competitive advantages to those that sanction antisocial behavior. The results presented indicate that the process of self-organization significantly elevates the effectiveness of punishment, and they reveal new mechanisms by means of which this fascinating and widespread social behavior could have evolved.

Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/88b5820d878653edde4c7703f0aa794b0a7db3cd

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

1. Matjaz Perc
2. Attila Szolnoki
3. Zhen Wang
4. Stefano Boccaletti
5. Jillian J. Jordan
6. David G. Rand
7. S. Michael Gaddis
8. Jesse J. Chandler

In Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health

1. Attila Szolnoki
2. Matjaz Perc
3. Zhen Wang
4. Mauro Mobilia
5. Taraneh Sowlati
6. Nazanin Shabani

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Matjaz Perc
2. Attila Szolnoki
3. Zhen Wang
4. Stefano Boccaletti
5. Jillian J. Jordan
6. David G. Rand
7. Mauro Mobilia
8. Bartosz Szczesny

Citations in the corpus

• Cyclic dominance in evolutionary games: a review (2014, background): “Interestingly, the introduction of self-organized punishment, when the fine increases proportional to the activity of defectors, prevents the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance and results in a more effective way of punishment [176].”
• Statistical physics of human cooperation (2017, background): “For the last two we refer to the original research [112], while the enhancement of network reciprocity, also in comparison to traditional peer punishment (see Section 5.”