The Bankers' New Clothes: What's Wrong With Banking and What to Do About It

By Anat R. Admati, Martin F. Hellwig. 2013

271 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/be084c64937635e06a59fe2e5bf7e147c42d5168

Citations in the corpus

• Bank Capital Redux: Solvency, Liquidity, and Crisis (2017, unknown): “1 Banking industry representatives emphasize that higher capital requirements reduce the availability of credit, while Admati et al. (2013) and Miles et al. (2013) argue that there are no social costs associated with higher capital ratios and significant increases in regulatory capital are therefore”
• Systemic Risk in Financial Networks: A Survey (2020, unknown): “…financial network setting: there are many settings in which the choice of investments might not reflect the interests of all those who are impacted (Admati & Hellwig (2013)), with an early illustration of this being made by Jensen & Meckling 27See Duffie & Zhu (2011) for more detailed discussion…”
• Why bank capital matters for monetary policy (2016, unknown): “Admati and Hellwig (2016) have pointed out that, if the Modigliani and Miller (MM) theorem holds, the return on equity (ROE) contains a risk premium that must go down if banks have more equity.”
• The Manipulation of Basel Risk-Weights (2014, unknown): “…in the evolution of its global standards: when the 3The view that high capital levels are costly is not undisputed: Admati et al. (2011) and Admati and Hellwig (2013), for example, have argued that higher equity levels would not impair banks’ activities because they would also reduce…”
• The Financial Crisis of 2007–2009: Why Did It Happen and What Did We Learn? (2015, unknown): “This exceeds what is prescribed by both the Basel II and III accords, but it is below what many believe is needed for financial stability (e.g., Acharya, Engle, and Richardson 2012; Admati and Hellwig 2013).”
• Banking Business Models Monitor 2015 Europe (2016, unknown): “See Admati & Hellwig (2013), Blundell-Wignall & Roulet (2013), Boot & Ratnovski (2012), and Gehrig (2015).”
• Capital requirements, risk choice, and liquidity provision in a business-cycle model (2020, unknown): “This is consistent with the observation of Adrian and Shin (2011), who found that bank equity is sticky.”
• The Great Mortgaging: Housing Finance, Crises, and Business Cycles (2014, unknown): “JEL Codes: C14, C38, C52, E32, E37, E44, E51, G01, G21, N10, N20.”
• Bank capital (requirements) and credit supply: Evidence from pillar 2 decisions (2016, unknown): “The fact that higher capital requirements lead to lower credit supply seems to indicate that equity capital costs for banks are not negligible, challenging the views of Admati et al. (2013) and Admati and Hellwig (2013).”
• Macroprudential Policy, Countercyclical Bank Capital Buffers, and Credit Supply: Evidence from the Spanish Dynamic Provisioning Experiments (2017, unknown): “Tax benefits of debt finance, public guarantees and asymmetric information about banks’ conditions imply that equity finance may be more costly for banks than debt finance (Freixas and Rochet (2008), Aiyar et al. (2014)).”
• Political Institutions and Bank Risk-Taking Behavior (2015, unknown): “For example, for capital levels, it is well established argument in post-crisis banking literature that lower levels of capital cause higher bank risk-taking (Admati & Hellwig 2013).”
• Bank Capital, Liquid Reserves, and Insolvency Risk (2017, unknown): “In our analysis we thus consider Tier 1 leverage ratio requirements at Ω = 4%, 7%, and 9% and implement a leverage ratio requirement at Ω = 20% to investigate the effects of the proposal by Admati and Hellwig (2013) to require bank to hold at least 20% of equity capital.”
• The impact of Treasury supply on financial sector lending and stability (2015, unknown): “In this view, articulated prominently by Admati and Hellwig (2013), banks issue short-term debt to take advantage of mispriced deposit insurance and implicit bailout guarantees. A third view of short-term debt emphasizes the special role of banks in creating liquidity. In this view, modeled in Diamo”